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Abstract
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court recognized the 
right of same-sex couples to be married.1  In doing so, the Court 
remedied the demeaning exclusion of a historically disadvantaged 
minority group from a nationally cherished institution, noting the 
stigma and injury the exclusion caused.  The sweeping language of 
the majority opinion in Obergefell and its focus on exclusionary 
harm suggested a new era of inclusion for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender Americans.2  This Article argues that the exclusion of 
transgender persons from military service constitutes the type of 
harm Obergefell and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit.
This Article first provides background on the pre-Obergefell 
landscape for constitutional challenges to military service exclu-
sion.  Second, the Article assesses Obergefell’s jurisprudential 
expansions of substantive due process and equal protection doc-
trines through its recognition of the exclusionary harm done to gay 
people by excluding them from the institution of marriage.  The 
Article uses the Court’s exclusionary harm analysis to assess the 
exclusion of a historically disadvantaged minority group from 
another nationally cherished institution: the Trump Administra-
tion’s ban on transgender persons serving in the military.  Third, 
the Article argues that Obergefell advanced a new equal protection 
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
2. While the opinion did not explicitly address transgender rights, the 
Court wrote, “[t]he Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, [in-
cluding the right] to define and express their identity.”  Id. at 2593.  Some com-
mentators observed this extended protections to transgender people.  See, e.g., 
Scott Skinner-Thompson, How Obergefell Could Help Transgender Rights, 
Slate (June 26, 2015), https://slate.com/human-interest/2015/06/obergefell-and-
trans-rights-the-supreme-courts-endorsement-of-identity-expression-could-
help-trans-activism.html [https://perma.cc/ZF3W-PVWP]; J. Courtney Sullivan, 
What Marriage Equality Means for Transgender Rights, N.Y. Times (July 16, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/opinion/what-marriage-equality-
means-for-transgender-rights.html [https://perma.cc/23M3-T2NV].
© 2020 Eric Merriam.  All rights reserved.
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doctrine: the government may not demean a group by excluding it 
from an important positive right resulting in dignitary harm.  The 
Article concludes that the transgender military ban constitutes the 
type of dignitary harm that Obergefell and the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibit.
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Eric Merriam is an Associate Professor at the University of 
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Introduction
The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Obergefell v. Hodg-
es that the Constitution protects the “equal dignity [of same-sex 
 couples] in the eyes of the law” suggested the arrival of constitu-
tionally protected legal equality for non-heterosexual persons.3 
Some commentators and scholars argued that Obergefell’s protec-
tions also extended to transgender persons.4  And yet, constitutional 
rights for members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
community remain precarious.5  This Article focuses on one such 
precarity—the exclusion of transgender people from military ser-
vice, also known as the “transgender military ban”—and addresses 
Obergefell’s impact on claims that this exclusion violates their con-
stitutional rights.
A case about marriage may seem like an odd place to concen-
trate a discussion of exclusion from the military, but the two issues 
are analogous.6  Like the plaintiffs in Obergefell, opponents of the 
3. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
4. See, e.g., Note, Equal Dignity—Heeding Its Call, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 
1323 (2019); Skinner-Thompson, supra note 2; Sullivan, supra note 2.
5. The Supreme Court has still failed to identify sexual orientation as 
a suspect classification, meaning any law that can be described as rationally 
related to accomplishing a legitimate state interest may discriminate on this 
basis.  Moreover, though the Court has identified “gender” as a quasisuspect 
classification, it has yet to apply that to transgender persons’ rights.  See Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
6. Given the similarities between the two issues, the near omission of 
Obergefell from early judicial opinions ruling in favor of plaintiffs challenging 
the transgender military ban is notable.  It also calls into question this Article’s 
claim that Obergefell both alters the analysis of discriminatory military service 
exclusion and other claims of exclusion.  See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 
3d 167, 207 (D.D.C. 2017) (no reference to Obergefell or to substantive due 
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transgender military ban are also challenging the exclusion of a his-
torically disadvantaged minority group from a cherished institution. 
Obergefell also addressed two of the most common constitutional 
bases for challenging military service exclusion: due process and 
equal protection.  Finally, the sweeping language of Justice Antho-
ny Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell suggests the Court 
would consider similar due process and equal protection arguments 
outside the context of marriage.  This Article examines Obergefell’s 
articulation of due process and equal protection rights, including 
the seeming convergence of these clauses in the Court’s analysis, 
and assesses Obergefell’s applicability to the Trump Administra-
tion’s transgender military ban.7
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the 
pre-Obergefell constitutional landscape for military service eli-
gibility challenges.  This Part also describes how federal courts 
addressed exclusionary policies after Lawrence v. Texas, where the 
Court held a Texas statute prohibiting members of the same sex 
process, despite being pleaded by plaintiffs; “[T]he Court finds the framework 
applicable to the Due Process Clause’s equal protection component most rele-
vant.”); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768 (D. Md. 2017) (no reference to 
Obergefell; “The Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their Equal 
Protection claim, as discussed below.  Therefore, the Court finds it unnecessary 
to analyze separately the merits of the Substantive Due Process claim.”); Kar-
noski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2017 WL 6311305, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 
2017) (cited Obergefell for proposition that fundamental interests include the 
right to make decisions concerning bodily integrity and self-definition central 
to an individual’s identity; no discussion of Obergefell’s modification of Glucks-
berg); Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17–1799 JGB (KKx), 2017 WL 9732572, 
at *15 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017) (citing Obergefell for notion that stigma is not 
easily erased, but ruling only on plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, not their sub-
stantive due process claim, in granting preliminary injunction).
7. On July 26, 2017, the President issued a statement via Twitter 
announcing:
After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be ad-
vised that the United States government will not accept or allow . . . [t]ransgen-
der individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military.  Our military must be 
focused on decisive and overwhelming . . . victory and cannot be burdened with 
the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military 
would entail. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 26, 2017, 
5:55 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/890193981585444864 
[https://perma.cc/FRP5-BTGH], Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), 
Twitter (July 26, 2017, 6:04 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/ 
status/890196164313833472 [https://perma.cc/2B82-BETH], Donald J. Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (July 26, 2017, 6:08 AM), https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/890197095151546369 [https://perma.cc/5YF4-8XJ5] 
[hereinafter July 26, 2017 Twitter Announcement] (barring transgender per-
sons from serving in the military).  For more details regarding the ban, see infra 
Subpart III.A.
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from engaging in certain intimate sexual acts was a violation of 
the due process clause.8  Part I explains how Obergefell altered the 
substantive due process landscape by making it easier for courts 
to identify fundamental rights and increasing the level of scruti-
ny applied to violation of due process claims.  Part II evaluates two 
scholarly interpretations of the link between due process and equal 
protection, before offering a new interpretation that, while Ober-
gefell changed little in the traditional equal protection landscape, 
it established a new type of equal protection violation: selective 
exclusion from positive rights as a dignitary harm.  Finally, Part III 
addresses Obergefell’s implications for military service eligibility 
challenges, analyzing how the new due process and equal protec-
tion landscapes could affect challenges to the transgender military 
ban.  The Article concludes that the transgender military ban con-
stitutes the type of dignitary harm that Obergefell and the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibit.
Before proceeding, I must acknowledge the first of two 
elephants in the room: military deference.  When discussing consti-
tutional rights in the context of national security and the military, 
courts often find the case nonjusticiable as a matter better left for 
the Executive or Legislative branches of government.9  And where 
courts purport to decide national security or defense cases on the 
merits, they often defer to Congress, observing, constitutional rights 
are different in the context of the military.10  Indeed, in one recent 
8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
9. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983) (“courts are 
ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intru-
sion upon military authority might have”); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 
(1981) (“judicial deference to [any] congressional exercise of authority is at its 
apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and 
support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is chal-
lenged”); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (military is “by necessity, a 
specialized society separate from civilian society”); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 
U.S. 83, 94 (1953) (“the judiciary [need] be as scrupulous not to interfere with 
legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene in ju-
dicial Matters”); Kelly E. Henriksen, Gays, the Military, and Judicial Deference: 
When the Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protection as Their Area of Expertise, 9 
Admin. L.J. Am. U. 1273 (1996).
10. See e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (noting that 
the Supreme Court gives Congress “the highest deference” in ordering mili-
tary affairs); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quoting Solorio 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1987)) (recognizing that the Supreme 
Court “[adheres] to [the] principle of deference in a variety of contexts [such 
as] where the constitutional rights of servicemen [are] implicated”); Cook v. 
Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying in essence procedural deference to 
a claim of an infringement on a substantive due process right, finding Congress 
had fully considered “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”  and thus the courts could not 
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case challenging the transgender ban, the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals punted on the constitutional question and instead invoked 
military deference.11  However, the nature, extent, and appropriate-
ness of military deference has been examined elsewhere and is not 
the subject of this Article.  Instead, the constitutional analysis in this 
Article addresses head-on the substantive constitutional issues pre-
sented by exclusion from the military.12
The second elephant is Justice Kennedy’s departure from the 
Supreme Court.  Because Justice Kennedy was replaced by Jus-
tice Brett Kavanaugh, a more ideologically conservative originalist, 
Kennedy’s Obergefell approach to questions implicating the Due 
Process Clause may no longer garner a majority.  Indeed, during 
his confirmation hearings, Justice Kavanaugh stated “all roads lead 
to the Glucksberg test as the test that the Supreme Court has set-
tled on as the proper test” for determining unenumerated rights.13 
As demonstrated in this Article, and as has been noted elsewhere,14 
substitute their own judgment).
11. Jane Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 Fed App’x 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
12. For a variety of reasons, I don’t think this enterprise of temporari-
ly ignoring deference is a fool’s errand.  First, the constitutional questions we 
address are of significance.  Second, not all judges defer and not all military 
actions get deference, and when they don’t, they have to do actual legal analysis. 
Third, judicial deference on military matters should treat congressional deci-
sions differently than executive ones.  Fourth, there’s a fair argument that the 
circumstances normally raising military deference are not implicated in some 
modern exclusions (e.g., compare Rostker deference, which relied on fact that in 
“exercising the congressional authority to raise and support armies” Congress 
did not act “unthinkingly” or “reflexively and not for any considered reason,” 
with the “Trump tweet” context of the transgender ban.  See Rostker, 453 U.S. 
at 72.  Finally, courts are not our only audience when considering constitutional 
questions.
13. Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, Brett Kavanaugh Is Cher-
ry-Picking the Cases He Says Count as Precedent, Slate (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/09/kavanaugh-confirmation-hear-
ings-on-abortion-and-same-sex-marriage-hes-cherry-picking-precedent.html 
[https://perma.cc/XLD8-4FW2].  The “Glucksberg test” for identifying whether 
the Due Process Clauses protect a right against infringement by the govern-
ment involves two prongs.  To be a “fundamental right,” the asserted fundamen-
tal liberty interest must be “carefully described;” and that carefully described 
liberty interest must be objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty 
nor justice exist without them.  Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
The Glucksberg test is discussed in greater detail in Subpart I.B.1 below.
14. See, e.g., Jamal Greene (@jamalgreene), Twitter (Sep. 8, 2018, 8:46 
PM), https://twitter.com/jamalgreene/status/1038589534483750913 [https:// 
perma.cc/8G78-KW8G] (Greene noted “Kavanaugh also repeatedly said 
Glucksberg is the guiding opinion in substantive due process cases.  Glucks-
berg is not mention[ed] in Lawrence (except Scalia’s *dissent*) and is explicitly 
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Kavanaugh’s characterization of Glucksberg as the “settled test” 
was wrong.  Regardless, Kavanaugh’s support for the Glucksberg 
test suggests at least five sitting Justices will avoid applying Oberge-
fell to future substantive due process cases.  Continued analysis 
of Obergefell is nonetheless important because, as of this Arti-
cle’s publication, its approach to substantive due process questions 
remains good law and it may again be the central issue in a future 
Supreme Court case.
I. The Pre-Obergefell Constitutional Landscape for 
Military Service Exclusion Challenges
A. Pre-Obergefell Equal Protection and Military Exclusion
Under equal protection jurisprudence, government actions 
that discriminate based on a suspect or quasisuspect classification 
are subjected to heightened scrutiny.  These classifications are race, 
national origin, alienage, sex, and legitimacy of birth.15  To with-
stand this heightened scrutiny, the government must provide a 
strong justification for its discriminatory act.16  Notably, no court 
had applied equal protection analysis to the military’s prior exclu-
sion of women and racial minorities because the military stopped 
discriminating against these groups before those forms of discrimi-
nation were declared suspect or quasisuspect classifications by the 
Supreme Court and thus could be challenged as a violation of equal 
protection.17
Government actions that discriminate on the basis of other 
classifications, like age or disability, are scrutinized under rational 
basis review.  This standard allows governments ample discretion 
to discriminate.  Thus, the young, aged, or physically disabled could 
challenge as a violation of equal protection a policy that excludes 
them from military service, but such a challenge would fail because 
those classifications are not suspect and the government could pro-
vide a plausible reason for their exclusion.18
disavowed in Obergefell”).
15. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (strict scrutiny ap-
plied to suspect classification based on race); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515 (1996) (intermediate scrutiny applied to classification by gender); Trimble 
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (intermediate scrutiny applied to quasisuspect 
classification based on legitimacy); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) 
(strict scrutiny applied to classification based on alienage).
16. Id.
17. The author is unaware of any equal protection challenges to mili-
tary policies regarding national origin or of any exclusionary policies based on 
legitimacy.
18. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 
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Equal protection challenges to exclusion from military ser-
vice have routinely failed.19  Modern challenges to military service 
exclusion have largely been in response to policies excluding peo-
ple on the basis of their sexual orientation, specifically the policy 
of “Don’t ask, don’t tell” (DADT).20  The Supreme Court has yet to 
hear a challenge to military exclusion on the basis of sexual identity. 
However, circuit courts, relying on Supreme Court decisions that 
did not apply heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual 
orientation, have applied only rational basis review.21  For example, 
when the Ninth Circuit upheld a challenge to DADT on substantive 
due process grounds, it declined to consider the case on equal pro-
tection grounds because the relevant precedent,  Lawrence v. Texas, 
did not rest on equal protection.22  Not surprisingly, courts apply-
(1985) (disability-based classification subject to rational basis review); Mass. 
Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age-based classifications subject to 
rational basis review).
19. Here I offer doctrinal reasons why equal protection challenges have 
generally failed.  Of course, other explanations exist.  The ever-present con-
cept of military deference can explain failing to fully evaluate equal protection 
challenges.  For example, the D.C. Circuit did precisely that in its review of 
one of the cases challenging the transgender ban.  Jane Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 
Fed App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. 2019).  Another explanation may be judicial unwilling-
ness to “open the litigation floodgates” by holding that some of the military’s 
numerous exclusionary classifications violate equal protection.  Additionally, 
though today we focus on disfavored groups challenging the military’s exclu-
sionary policies, before the modern era, there were few military service cases 
where the plaintiff was someone trying to gain entrance into the military; more 
frequently, cases were about people being forced (conscripted) into the military 
against their will.
20. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-169, 107 Stat. 1547 (1993) (codified as 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (repealed 2010)) 
prohibited military service by persons who engaged in “homosexual conduct,” 
which was defined to include same-sex sexual acts and stating one was homo-
sexual.  Though President William J. Clinton’s campaign included a promise to 
end the ban on service by lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons, objection by con-
servative Republicans and Democrats in the Democrat-controlled 103rd Con-
gress and military leaders forced a compromise under which lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual persons could serve, but could not engage in same sex sexual conduct 
or admit their sexual orientation.  New President Faces Gay-Soldiers Conflict, 
CQ Almanac, 1993, at 454–62, http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal93-
1106232 [https://perma.cc/QX5J-UCSB].
21. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (relying on 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 
neither of which explicitly applied heightened scrutiny to equal protection chal-
lenges based on sexual orientation); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 
1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1425–26 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting an Equal Protection Clause challenge to DADT under rational basis 
review).
22. Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).  The court held 
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ing rational basis review have held that military effectiveness is a 
legitimate government interest and excluding people who allegedly 
compromise its effectiveness is rationally related to accomplishing 
that legitimate goal.
Equal protection challenges based on the emerging doc-
trine of animus—sometimes referred to as “rational basis review 
plus”—may receive more traction.23  As I have argued elsewhere, 
exclusions based on unit cohesion constitute impermissible ani-
mus.24  And other indicators of animus, such as the circumstances 
surrounding President Trump’s initial announcement of the trans-
gender military ban, may cause courts to scrutinize more carefully 
the exclusions that appear to be motivated by a desire to harm the 
excluded group.25  But in the past, federal courts have failed to find 
that when the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and private 
lives of lesbian, gay, and bisexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights iden-
tified in Lawrence, the government must advance an important governmental 
interest, the intrusion must significantly further that interest, and the intrusion 
must be necessary to further that interest.  In other words, for the third factor, a 
less intrusive means must be unlikely to achieve substantially the government’s 
interest.  Importantly, the court did not hold that the personal and private lives 
of lesbian, gay, and bisexuals constituted a “fundamental right,” noting that 
Lawrence had not so proclaimed, and had struck down the Texas criminal pro-
hibition on same sex sodomy as violative of the Due Process Clause not with 
strict scrutiny, but with something akin to intermediate scrutiny.
23. Animus is the emerging equal protection doctrine through which the 
Court has asserted that discrimination based on dislike of a disfavored minority 
violates the Equal Protection Clause.  As noted elsewhere, the Court’s animus 
jurisprudence is yet incomplete.  See, e.g., Eric Merriam, Fire, Aim, Ready! Mil-
itarizing Animus: “unit Cohesion” and the Transgender Ban, 123 Penn St. Dick. 
L. Rev. 57, 64 (2018).  However, the Court has to this point identified four types 
of animus: animus based on private stereotype and prejudice (see, e.g., Palmore 
v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432); animus demonstrated 
by legislative desire to harm (see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528 (1973)); animus demonstrated by structure (see, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 620); 
and dignitary injury as impermissible animus (see, e.g., U.S.  v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 
744 (2013)).
24. “Unit cohesion” generally refers to a military group’s mutual rein-
forcement of positive behaviors and attitudes toward group membership and 
commitment to a common goal and is widely considered an essential element 
of military effectiveness.  Unit cohesion has been offered by some as a basis to 
exclude those whose presence might be considered detrimental to cohesion and 
thus military effectiveness.  See, e.g., Merriam, supra note 23, at 57.
25. In fact, one district court addressing the transgender military ban at 
least entertained the possibility that animus underlies the ban. Doe 1 v. Trump, 
275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 211 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Moreno, 413 U.S. at 528 and Wind-
sor, 570 U.S. at 744 for the proposition that “‘a bare . . . desire to harm a polit-
ically unpopular group cannot justify disparate treatment of that group,” but 
not engaging a full analysis to determine whether such a bare desire to harm 
existed in the transgender ban’s development).
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that even so-called “rational basis review plus” bars military dis-
crimination.  In Cook v. Gates, plaintiffs asserted that DADT was 
based on irrational animus, but the court found that unit cohe-
sion and resulting military effectiveness were a “non-animus-based 
explanation” for DADT.26  Indeed, part of the “pre-Obergefell” 
equal protection landscape is a general apprehensiveness by dis-
trict courts to rely on animus doctrine.27
In short, no Supreme Court precedent exists for the propo-
sition that exclusion from military service eligibility violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, and appellate courts have largely rejected 
such challenges.28
B. Pre-Obergefell Substantive Due Process and Military Service 
Eligibility
1. Pre-Obergefell Substantive Due Process Generally
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments—which say that the government cannot deprive a person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law—provide not 
only a right to procedure, but also imply there are some rights so 
fundamental that the government cannot take them away “at all, 
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”29  Some liberty 
interests are so fundamental that the government’s infringement 
on them warrants heightened scrutiny.  Cases relying on substan-
tive due process analysis have been exceedingly controversial, 
26. Cook, 528 F.3d at 61–62.
27. District courts have long been wary of relying on animus, and have 
continued to be so, even in same-sex marriage cases after Windsor.  See, e.g., 
Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 183, 184 n.3 (2013); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1207 (D. 
Utah 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not yet delineated the contours of such 
an approach . . . .”); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Lee 
v. Orr, No. 13-cv-8719, 2014 WL 683680, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014); Bourke 
v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 552 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (“Absent a clear showing 
of animus, however, the Court must still search for any rational relation to a 
legitimate government purpose”; the court struck down state’s nonrecognition 
of valid same-sex marriages from out of state as lacking a rational basis); Bostic 
v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 460 (E.D. Va. 2014) (asserting that bans on same-
sex marriage were “rooted in unlawful prejudice” but concluding that the laws 
lacked a rational basis); Bishop v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1278–79, 
1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 995 (S.D. 
Ohio 2013).
28. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260–61 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996).
29. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
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with some ranking among the most reviled and debated Supreme 
Court opinions.30
The central difficulty is that because the fundamental rights 
implied by the Due Process Clauses are not explicitly identified in 
the Constitution, the judicial task is to identify which rights are, in 
fact, fundamental and thus entitled to something more than rational 
basis review.  The Supreme Court crystallized the test for determin-
ing whether a right is fundamental in Washington v. Glucksberg.31 
In finding no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide,32  the 
majority articulated what has become later known as the “Glucks-
berg Test” for identifying fundamental rights:
(1) The asserted fundamental liberty interest must be “careful-
ly described;” and
(2) That carefully described liberty interest must be objec-
tively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither lib-
erty nor justice exist without them.33
This test set a high bar for recognizing fundamental rights.  As 
opponents have long decried, this test is inherently conservative, 
protecting only longstanding interests, thereby curtailing the iden-
tification of new fundamental rights.
Before Obergefell, there was some debate among the justices 
regarding whether the right should be “carefully described” or “spe-
cifically described,” or even perhaps “most specifically described.”34 
The Glucksberg majority seems to have chosen the word “carefully” 
in order to secure the signatures of a majority of Justices.  Glucks-
berg was a unanimous judgment, but only five justices joined the 
opinion of the Court.  Justices Kennedy and O’Connor suggested 
they disagreed with describing a right at its most specific or least 
abstract, as Justice Scalia had advocated in Michael H. v. Gerald D.35 
30. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); Lochner v. New 
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell 
World, 27 Yale J.L. & Feminism 331 (2016).
35. For example, Justice Scalia had stated that courts should frame a right 
at “the most specific level at which . . . the asserted right can be identified,” but 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor did not join that portion of the opinion. Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).  In fact, they wrote separately 
to note that “most specific level” was inconsistent with prior decisions in earlier 
cases, such as Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (“right to marry,” not “right 
to marry someone of a different race”) and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
Moreover, after Michael H., Justices Kennedy and O’Connor again noted that 
52 Vol. 27.41UCLA WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL
Under the Glucksberg test, the level of abstraction at which a right 
was described is almost always outcome-determinative.  For exam-
ple, if the right at issue is the “right to marry,” the answer to whether 
that right is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history will be much dif-
ferent than if the right at issue is “the right to marry someone of 
the same sex.”  In Glucksberg itself, the Court described the right 
at issue as “a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to 
assistance in doing so” rather than more abstract alternatives, such 
as the “right to die,” “right to bodily integrity,” or “right to individ-
ual autonomy.”36
Prior to Obergefell, if the government action infringed on 
a fundamental right, the inquiry was not over; the government’s 
infringement was then subjected to some form of heightened scru-
tiny.  This is often referred to as strict scrutiny, though the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly identified protected liberty interests and then 
applied scrutiny that appeared to be less than strict scrutiny and 
more than rational basis review.37  Often, this has involved “balanc-
ing” infringements on liberty against asserted government interests.
2. Pre-Obergefell Substantive Due Process and Military 
Service Eligibility
The Supreme Court has never found that military service 
eligibility exclusions infringe on a fundamental right.  Before 
Obergefell, federal appeals courts routinely denied due process 
“most specific level” did not accurately describe the Court’s jurisprudence. 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
36. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 72.
37. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (Court recog-
nized a “constitutionally protected liberty interest [for a criminal defendant] in 
avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs” and then applied 
a standard of review lower than strict scrutiny by asking whether administer-
ing the drugs was “necessary significantly to further important governmental 
trial-related interests.”) (citations omitted); Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (Court re-
affirmed a woman’s fundamental right to choose to have an abortion but ap-
plied the “undue burden” test which balanced the state’s legitimate interest 
in potential human life against the extent of the imposition on the woman’s 
liberty interest); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67–75 (2000) (Court invalidat-
ed law based on due process interest in parental autonomy without applying 
rational basis or strict scrutiny); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135–36 (1992) 
(balancing an individual’s interest in refusing psychotropic drugs against the 
government’s interest in trying a competent criminal defendant for a violent 
crime); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278–79 (1990) (balanc-
ing “protected liberty interest” in refusing unwanted medical treatment against 
the government interest in promoting life).  Even Lawrence arguably failed to 
apply strict scrutiny; in invalidating the convictions, the Court determined that 
there was no “legitimate” state interest that was adequate to “justify” the intru-
sion on liberty. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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challenges against military service exclusion.38  The most recent and 
relevant litigation regarding exclusion from military service was in 
the context of DADT.  DADT was upheld repeatedly by federal 
courts, which, save for one notable exception, found no fundamen-
tal right was implicated, and thus applied rational basis review to 
the due process challenge.39
Even after Lawrence, where the Supreme Court articulat-
ed a right to intimate association between consenting adults in the 
privacy of one’s own home, DADT withstood a due process chal-
lenge.40  The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Cook v. Gates typifies 
the pre-Obergefell understanding of substantive due process that 
no fundamental right was implicated by military service exclu-
sion.41  There, the plaintiffs argued DADT was unconstitutional 
because Lawrence held that the Due Process Clause establishes 
protection for “certain decisions regarding sexual conduct [that] 
extend . . . beyond the martial relationship.”42  The Second Circuit 
acknowledged that Lawrence had recognized a protected liber-
ty interest for adults to engage in consensual sexual intimacy in 
the home, and further that the Lawrence Court had applied some 
form of heightened scrutiny to Texas’ infringement on that right.43 
Before ultimately dispensing with the challenge to DADT by giving 
deference to Congress’s constitutional role in raising and support-
ing armies, the Cook Court recognized that the government’s 
interest in preserving the military’s effectiveness as a fighting force 
was “an exceedingly weighty interest and one that unquestionably 
surpasses the government interest that was at stake in Lawrence.”44 
However, the Cook Court did not engage in the balancing test it 
had just divined from Lawrence.  Rather, the Court asserted that 
“where Congress has articulated a substantial government interest 
38. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260–61 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996); Woodward v. United States, 
871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989); and Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 
1980).
39. Id.
40. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); National Defense Authori-
zation Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-169, 107 Stat 1547 (1993) (codi-
fied as 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (repealed 2010)).
41. Cook, 528 F.3d at 42.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 56 (finding that Lawrence was “another in this line of Supreme 
Court authority that identifies a protected liberty interest and then applies a 
standard of review that lies between strict scrutiny and rational basis”).  The 
court characterized Lawrence’s heightened scrutiny as a balancing test that 
weighed the strength of the state’s asserted interest in prohibiting immoral con-
duct against the degree of intrusion into the petitioners’ private sexual life.
44. Id. at 60.
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for a law, and where the challenges in question implicate that inter-
est, judicial intrusion is simply not warranted.”45  This analysis 
reversed traditional due process analysis, which would first identify 
the existence of a fundamental right before determining whether 
the government’s rationale for infringement of it was sufficient.
In Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, the Ninth Circuit upheld a 
servicemember’s challenge to DADT on substantive due process 
grounds.46  Relying on Lawrence, the court applied heightened scru-
tiny but did not address why exclusion from military service was 
analogous to other established interests and infringements war-
ranting strict scrutiny.47  Such government intrusions have typically 
involved not only denial of a privilege like military service, but 
criminal sanctions, often with the potential to result in deprivation 
of actual physical liberty.48  Moreover, the Witt court concluded that 
heightened scrutiny should be an as-applied analysis, rather than 
facial.  In other words, whether DADT could survive heightened 
scrutiny was not based on the government’s “hypothetical, posthoc 
rationalization in general” of the policy, but instead on whether a 
justification existed for the application of the policy as applied to 
the plaintiff.49
Planitiffs challenging military service exclusion as violating 
substantive due process have generally argued that the exclusion 
infringed on a fundamental right.  However, they have articulated 
that right as something other than a positive “right to serve in the 
military.”  That is, plaintiffs have generally asserted the fundamental 
right to be free from government infringement on liberty—a “neg-
ative right” to be left alone, rather than a positive right to military 
service.  For example, challenges to DADT argued the military’s 
discriminatory service eligibility rules infringed on the right to 
engage in consensual sexual conduct in the privacy of one’s home.50
45. Id.
46. Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008).
47. Id. at 817.  The Witt court also cited another Supreme Court opin-
ion for this heightened scrutiny balancing test.  See Sell v. United States, 539 
U.S. 166, 179 (2003) (forcible administration of antipsychotic medication on 
prisoners).
48. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
49. Witt, 527 F.3d at 819 (2008).  The Court remanded to the district court 
to develop the record regarding this as-applied analysis.
50. See, e.g., id. at 813.
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II. What did Obergefell Do?
In short, Obergefell opened up the possibility that the Supreme 
Court would again articulate a new fundamental right.
A. A New (Old?) Approach to Substantive Due Process and 
Fundamental Rights
1. Obergefell’s Post-Glucksberg Approach to Identifying 
Fundamental Rights
The Court’s opinion in Obergefell suggests the possibility 
of identifying new fundamental rights.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s 
approach to fundamental rights returns the Court to a common 
law approach, where judges “exercise reasoned judgment” rather 
than mechanically applying formulas.51  The dissenters in Oberge-
fell strenuously objected to Kennedy’s common law methodology,52 
though numerous scholars have come to its defense.53  Kennedy did 
not claim to abandon Glucksberg altogether, but instead suggested 
that Glucksberg was only one way to identify fundamental rights. 
In Obergefell, the Court unlocked both prongs of the Glucksberg 
51. Justice Kennedy places this admonition at the beginning of his sub-
stantive explanation of due process:
The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an en-
during part of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.  That 
responsibility, however, “has not been reduced to any formula.”  
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(parallel citations omitted).  Rather, it requires courts to exercise 
reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so funda-
mental that the State must accord them its respect.  That process 
is guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis 
of other constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles 
rather than specific requirements.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).
52. See, e.g., id. at 2619–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is revealing that 
the majority’s position requires it to effectively overrule Glucksberg”).  Some 
scholars had suggested that Justice Kennedy had already modified Glucksberg 
in Lawrence v. Texas. Cf., Nicolas, Fundamental Rights, supra note 34 (arguing 
the Obergefell majority’s analysis was consistent with Glucksberg and other 
precedent).  In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority opinion that 
the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause did not permit crimi-
nalization of adult consensual “intimate conduct.”  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 567 (2003).  The question remained whether the Court’s approach in Law-
rence had modified the Glucksberg test.  As Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence 
noted, the Lawrence majority did not overrule Glucksberg explicitly, so the only 
question was whether its approach implicitly overruled Glucksberg.  Id. at 593 
(Scalia, J. dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 147, 169–72 (2015); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: 
Speaking Its Name, 20 Harv. L. Rev. F. 16, 17 (2015).
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test.54  In addressing the first prong, the Obergefell majority eluci-
dated the “careful description” requirement of identifying the right 
at issue, clarifying that a right need not be identified at its most spe-
cific or lowest level of abstraction.55  As explained above, the level 
of generality at which the Court articulates the right at issue can be 
outcome determinative for a substantive due process challenge.56
In discussing how to articulate the right at issue in a due pro-
cess case, the Obergefell majority also observed that “if rights were 
defined by those who exercised them in the past, then received 
practices could serve as their own continued justification and new 
groups could not invoke rights once denied.”  In other words, an 
exclusionary articulation of the right at issue necessarily remains 
exclusionary.  The Obergefell majority thus argued that the correct 
articulation of the right at issue to be the “right to marry,” not the 
more specific “right to marry someone of the same sex.”57  Oberge-
fell stands for the proposition that the right at issue in substantive 
due process claims must be articulated more generally, such that the 
articulation does not necessarily include the discrimination at issue.
What remains unclear, however, is what other factors dictate 
the level of generality at which a right should be articulated.  While 
Obergefell does not provide explicit guidance, we can look at how 
the Court describes rights to infer how they should be articulated. 
For example, the Court referred repeatedly to a “right to marry,” 
which suggests a more general articulation of the implicated right. 
54. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)) (“(1) The asserted fundamental liberty interest must be 
‘carefully described;’ and (2) That carefully described liberty interest must be 
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice would exist 
if they were sacrificed.”).
55. In Obergefell, the majority explained that, although the Glucksberg 
approach for defining rights in a “most circumscribed manner  .  .  . may have 
been appropriate for the asserted right” of physician-assisted suicide, “it is 
inconsistent with the approach the Court has taken with other fundamental 
rights, including marriage and intimacy.”  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.  This was 
no real departure from Justice Kennedy’s prior jurisprudence regarding articu-
lating the right at issue in due process cases.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 
491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (“[o]n occasion the Court has characterized relevant 
traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be the 
‘most specific level’ available”) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part (an opinion in 
which Kennedy, J., joined); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.).
56. See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 34, at 337 (citing Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 
456, 477 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring); Bostic v. Schaever, 760 F.3d 
352, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)).
57. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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However, the Court also observed that the Due Process Clause 
protects “certain specific rights that allow persons . . . to define and 
express their identity” or “certain personal choices central to indi-
vidual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define 
personal identity and beliefs,”  suggesting a more specific articula-
tion of the implicated right.58  Thus, the Court itself does not provide 
a clear model for how to define the right.
The Obergefell majority also reframed Glucksberg’s second 
prong, the requirement to find fundamental rights only in “tradition 
and history.”  The Obergefell majority stated that “liberty” is evolu-
tive and that “rights come not from ancient sources alone” but also 
“rise . . . from a better informed understanding of how constitution-
al imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in our own era.”59 
In other words, history and tradition do not establish the “outer 
boundaries” of potential fundamental rights, so new fundamental 
rights may be discovered.60
The Obergefell majority did not dismiss history altogether. 
The opinion elaborated four “principles and traditions” girding 
marriage’s status as a fundamental right, relying heavily on his-
tory.61  However, discussion of the four principles and traditions 
included a more sophisticated historical analysis that went beyond 
the originalist approach of asking “did our forefathers think one 
had a liberty to do X?”  The majority acknowledged the histori-
cal importance of marriage and its evolution, providing an almost 
poetic accounting of why society and government attach such sig-
nificance to marriage today.62
The Obergefell majority paid little attention to the latter part 
of Glucksberg’s second prong, which requires that to be fundamen-
tal, the asserted right must be “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty such that neither liberty nor justice exist in their absence.” 
The Obergefell majority referred once to substantive due process 
rights as “implicit in liberty,” but that was in the context of con-
trasting the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. 
Justice Kennedy did not explain what the “concept of ordered lib-
erty” means or how it applied to the asserted right to marry.  This 
58. Yoshino has offered the plausible expectation that removing the 
“careful description” requirement, Justice Kennedy moved the Court away 
from a jurisprudence focused on detailed unenumerated rights and toward a 
broader “enumerated right of liberty.”  Yoshino, supra note 53.
59. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2599–602.
62. Id.
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omission might suggest that this requirement has disappeared, 
though it perhaps remains a consideration.
The effect of loosening both prongs of the Glucksberg test in 
tandem is profound.  If only the careful description requirement 
had been loosened, history still would have been a constraint in 
recognizing new fundamental rights.63  And if only the tradition and 
history requirement had been loosened, finding evidence of any tra-
dition supporting a right described at its most specific would still be 
difficult.64  By loosening both prongs simultaneously, the Obergefell 
majority freed courts to look to the universe of principles and tra-
ditions that define which rights are fundamental.
2. Obergefell Suggested a New (Old) Form of Scrutiny 
When Protected Liberty Interests are Infringed
When government action infringes on a protected liberty, 
courts typically apply some form of heightened scrutiny.65  Which 
level of scrutiny applies is not always clear or consistent.  As dis-
cussed further below, the Obergefell majority did not resolve this 
issue, though it suggested a balancing test that requires judges to 
“assess the relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the contending inter-
ests”66 and determine whether the government has provided “a 
sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from the 
right.”67  Importantly, Obergefell provided no example of how this 
63. For instance, an abstractly drawn right would still be subject to wheth-
er such a right had been historically protected.
64. Indeed, in cases where new rights are asserted, and even more in cas-
es where new groups seek inclusion in old rights, specific articulation of the 
right would nearly always mean lack of tradition’s support for the right.
65. See, e.g., Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 
902, 904 (1986) (acknowledging that “[w]henever a state law infringes a con-
stitutionally protected right, we [the court] undertake[s] intensified equal pro-
tection scrutiny of that law”); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (affirming that “where fundamental rights and liberties are 
asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade 
or restrain them must be closely scrutinized . . . .”).
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766–67 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring in judgment).  Justice Souter cited Harlan’s Poe dissent to observe 
that “the kind and degree of justification that a sensitive judge would demand 
of a State would depend on the importance of the interest being asserted by the 
individual.”  Id. at 762 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)).  Importantly, the Court cited the Souter and Breyer concurrences 
in Glucksberg, in which they state that the appropriate “test” is a “sufficient 
justification” balancing approach. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (citing Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. at 752–73, 789–92 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in judgments)).
67. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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“sufficient justification balancing” is to be conducted.68  Moreover, 
it is unclear what level of liberty interest triggers the requirement 
to conduct a balancing analysis, rather than simply applying ratio-
nal basis review.69
After Lawrence, two federal appellate courts addressing con-
stitutional challenges to DADT noted that the liberty interest in 
Lawrence was not characterized as fundamental and yet received 
some level of heightened scrutiny.70  Obergefell did not answer 
whether liberty interests that are “important,” but not “fundamen-
tal” should receive some level of heightened scrutiny.71
68. Without engaging explicitly in any balancing of contending interests, 
the majority characterized the right to marriage as fundamental and concluded 
that same-sex marriage bans violated the Due Process Clause.  Id.
69. The Obergefell majority repeatedly mentioned the fundamentality 
of the right to marriage, which may suggest that a liberty interest is specially 
protected by substantive due process only when it is fundamental.  See, e.g., 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–99 (“the fundamental liberties protected by [the 
Due Process] Clause . . . extend to certain personal choices central to individ-
ual dignity and autonomy”; “the identification and protection of fundamental 
rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty”; courts must “exercise reasonable 
judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State 
must accord them its respect;” the reasons marriage is fundamental under the 
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples”).  Supporters of this 
view can draw additional support from the fact that the majority cited Justice 
Harlan’s Poe dissent, in which he proposed that the Due Process Clause re-
quires courts to “exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interest of the per-
son so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.”  Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 542) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court has on numerous occasions applied what ap-
peared to be heightened scrutiny to infringements on liberty interests that were 
not characterized as “fundamental.”  See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 
210, 221–23, 228 (1990) (a state prisoner “possesses a significant liberty interest” 
under the Due Process Clause to avoid the unwanted administration of certain 
drugs) (emphasis added); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (describing 
a child’s “substantial liberty interest” in not being confined unnecessarily for 
medical treatment) (emphasis added); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (Court described the interest as a “protected 
liberty”) (emphasis added); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 
278 (1990) (describing the interest as a “constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est”) (emphasis added); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–17 (1982).
70. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (“It is . . . clear 
that the Supreme Court does not always use the word ‘fundamental’ when it 
wishes to identify an interest protected by substantive due process.”); Witt v. 
Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 814–16 (9th Cir. 2008).
71. One explanation for this omission is that the obvious fundamentality 
of the right to marriage meant the question of whether heightened scrutiny 
should apply to liberties that are not fundamental was not before the Court.
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B. The Link Between Due Process and Equal Protection
Though Obergefell has been widely interpreted as resting pri-
marily on substantive due process, the decision also affected equal 
protection jurisprudence.72  The majority referred to the “profound 
connection” between the Equal Protection and Due Process Claus-
es, writing, “[the] interrelation of the two principles furthers our 
understanding of what freedom is and must become.”  The Court 
thereby suggested that constitutional questions invoking both 
clauses may have different answers than those implicating only one.
While Obergefell is not a traditional equal protection analysis, 
equal protection plays a crucial role in the opinion.  For example, 
consider the majority’s discussion of equality and exclusion in the 
due process analysis:
 As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious 
by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status 
has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in 
important respects.  It demeans gays and lesbians for the State 
to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.73
The opinion further states:
 [W]hen sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law 
and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the impri-
matur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or 
stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.  Under the 
Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal 
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their 
choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.74
That Justice Kennedy planted these seeds of equality in the 
due process section of his garden illustrates what may be Oberge-
fell’s most salient rights-protecting feature: the link between the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in protecting against 
government-imposed dignitary harm.
Importantly, the majority began its discussion of equal pro-
tection by noting the relationship between due process and equal 
protection:
 Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal pro-
tection may rest on different precepts and are not always 
co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instruc-
tive as to the meaning and reach of the other.  [T]he two 
72. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2635–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing majority erred in using substantive due process to guarantee a positive 
right); Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 Calif. L. Rev. Cir. 137, 
142–44 (2015).
73. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601–02.
74. Id. at 2602.
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Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of 
the right . . .  This interrelation of the two principles furthers 
our understanding of what freedom is and must become.75
The majority’s conclusion is that the two clauses converge 
to further our understanding of freedom, which is a principle that 
evokes the liberty of the Due Process Clause.  But in the context of 
Obergefell, freedom is perhaps better understood as deriving from 
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, particularly 
when the freedom at issue is protection against government-im-
posed dignitary harm.
The Obergefell majority quoted Loving v. virginia for the idea 
that the equal protection violation of anti-miscegenation statutes 
informed the due process violation:
With this link to equal protection, the Court proceeded to 
hold that the prohibition offended central precepts of liberty: “To 
deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so 
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens 
of liberty without due process of law.”  The reasons why marriage is 
a fundamental right became more clear and compelling from a full 
awareness and understanding of the hurt that resulted from laws 
barring interracial unions.76
Here, the Court seems to assert that inequality can help iden-
tify important liberties.  When government unequally provides a 
right, and that inequality serves to demean or stigmatize the exclud-
ed group, the asserted liberty interest can be viewed as fundamental 
for substantive due process analysis.77  In other words, a right must 
be fundamental if exclusion from it really hurts.
Of course, the idea that equal protection and due process 
are related did not arrive with Obergefell.  First, as the major-
ity observed, previous cases had in some way acknowledged the 
75. Id. at 2603.
76. Id. (quoting Loving v. virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
77. The Obergefell majority cited another marriage in which the equal 
protection violation was selective exclusion from a fundamental right.  In Za-
blocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978), where fathers who were behind on 
child support were barred from marrying without judicial approval, the major-
ity rested its analysis on the Equal Protection Clause.  The Obergefell Court 
summarized Zablocki, noting “The equal protection analysis depended in cen-
tral part on the Court’s holding that the law burdened a right ‘of fundamental 
importance.’”  It was the essential nature of the marriage right, discussed at 
length in Zablocki, that made apparent the law’s “incompatibility with require-
ments of equality.”  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (quoting and citing Zablocki, 
434 U.S. at 383–87).
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relationship between the two.78  Scholars, too, had explored the 
interrelationship long before Obergefell.79  Kenji Yoshino noted 
that even before Obergefell, Justice Kennedy had illustrated the 
relationship between the Equal Protection and Due Process Claus-
es in Lawrence.80  Specifically, the Court’s decision to strike down 
not only the sex-specific antisodomy law in Lawrence, but to simul-
taneously overrule Bowers v. Hardwick,81 in which the Court had 
upheld Georgia’s prohibition of all sodomy, demonstrated that the 
issue in Lawrence was not just equality.
Following Obergefell, scholars have attempted to explain the 
relationship between due process and equal protection in the opin-
ion.  We now turn to two such explanations: (1) Kenji Yoshino’s 
antisubordination liberty; and (2) Peter Nicolas’s positive-negative 
rights distinction.82
78. Obergefell 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Zablocki, 
434 U.S. at 383; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119–24 (1996) (acknowledging that 
sometimes “due process and equal protection principles converge”); Eisenstadt 
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446–54 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535, 538–43 (1942); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003)).
79. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and The 
Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33 McGeorge L. Rev. 473, 492 (2002) (ob-
serving that a stereoscopic understanding of the two clauses, where understand-
ings of liberty and equality inform each other, lead to “fuller and more just 
answers” to constitutional questions); Ira C. Lupu, untangling the Strands of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 981, 985 (1979) (arguing the Court 
had tangled the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in a “thick, almost 
impenetrable, knot,” because the Court had uncritically substituted one for the 
other, blurring liberty and equality as constitutional ideals); Nicolas, supra note 
34, at 348–49 (noting Skinner found a fundamental right to procreate in the 
Equal Protection Clause, likely in an attempt to distance itself from Lochner).
80. Yoshino, supra note 53 (explaining that the law in Lawrence could 
have been considered on equal protection grounds alone, but the law in Bowers, 
which was a sex-neutral antisodomy provision, could not).
81. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
82. A third “theory” has received some attention.  In a brief essay pub-
lished shortly after Obergefell, Larry Tribe acknowledged that the “anti-subor-
dination principle” played an important role in Obergefell’s “doctrinal achieve-
ment,” but he saw Obergefell’s meaning in “more expansive terms.”  Tribe, supra 
note 53.  Tribe argued Obergefell’s “chief jurisprudential achievement is to have 
tightly wound the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a 
doctrine of equal dignity.”  Unfortunately, though Tribe celebrated the arrival 
of equal dignity, he did little to describe what equal dignity doctrine is and 
how it works.  Moreover, discussion of a constitutional doctrine of equal dignity 
does not appear anywhere in the Obergefell majority opinion.  Justice Kenne-
dy employs the phrase “equal dignity” three times and never to announce the 
constitutional doctrine Tribe suggests.  Accordingly, I do not consider it further 
here.
632020 IDENTITy-BASED MILITARy SERvICE ExCLuSION
1. Antisubordination Liberty
Kenji Yoshino has argued that Obergefell differed from Law-
rence in that it invoked both due process and equal protection, 
rather than solely due process.  He thus views Obergefell as the cul-
mination of a doctrine of “anti-subordination liberty.”83  Under this 
theory, combining due process and equal protection rights means 
that courts analyzing the existence of a fundamental right should 
consider the effect on subordinated groups if the liberty were grant-
ed or denied to all.84  On the question of same-sex marriage, Yoshino 
observes that Obergefell’s due process-based ruling protected the 
equality interests of gays and lesbians better than an equal protec-
tion-based decision would have, because it prevented states from 
“leveling down” and refusing to grant marriage licenses to all cou-
ples.85  Yoshino argues that, post-Obergefell, judges cannot invent 
fundamental rights without limitation; they can only articulate fun-
damental rights in situations in which selective exclusion from the 
right would subordinate a group.86
Additionally, Yoshino found the majority bridged the posi-
tive-negative rights divide.  Traditionally, the Due Process Clause 
has protected fundamental rights from government intrusion rath-
er than provide a positive or affirmative right to something.87  In 
Obergefell,  Justice Kennedy wrote, “full promise of liberty”  not the 
“full promise of equality.”88  This suggests that liberty, as analyzed 
under substantive due process, can provide positive rights.89
83. Yoshino, supra note 53.
84. Id. at 174.
85. Id. at 173 (noting “an individual could hold the principled view that 
the state should be out of the marriage business,” yet have qualms if the reason 
for shutting down civil marriage is the threat of same-sex couples entering the 
institution).
86. Id. at 174–75 (citing Glucksberg as an example of the Court not find-
ing a fundamental right, in part due to respecting the state’s “interest in protect-
ing vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons—
from abuse, neglect, and mistakes” (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 
(1997)).
87. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126–27 (1992) 
(affirming that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is “a lim-
itation on the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels 
of safety and security”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (arguing 
that while “the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection 
against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the 
context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such 
funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom”).
88. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015) (emphasis added).
89. Yoshino, supra note 53, at 168.
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For example, the liberty interest in Lawrence was freedom 
from government intrusion in intimate association between con-
senting adults in the privacy of their home.  Indeed, most of the 
substantive due process canon has involved such negative liberties, 
including fundamental rights of contract,90 procreative autonomy,91 
privacy,92 privacy that includes a right to be free from undue burdens 
on abortion, 93 and parental control of education.94  The aforemen-
tioned fundamental rights were articulated in cases in which the 
right at issue was to be free from government intrusion (negative 
liberties), rather than a demand that the government provide or do 
something (positive liberties).
The Obergefell dissenters argued that Lawrence was distin-
guishable because it arose in the context of negative rights.95  The 
majority responded that, although Lawrence had confirmed a 
“dimension of freedom to engage in intimate association without 
criminal liability, it does not follow that freedom stops there.  Out-
law to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the 
full promise of liberty.”96  Beyond this solitary assertion, the majori-
ty opinion did not address positive versus negative rights.  It is thus 
unclear which view Obergefell represents.  Does substantive due 
process now serve as a basis for positive and negative rights?  Or 
is this another example of “marriage exceptionalism,” such that 
Obergefell’s approach to the reality that marriage includes both 
positive and negative rights has no application regarding the ques-
tion of positive and negative rights beyond marriage?
2. Fundamental Rights as Equal Protection-Guaranteed 
Gateways
Peter Nicolas has provided an alternative explanation of 
equal protection’s role in Obergefell.97  Nicolas argues that the rea-
90. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
91. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
Note that Skinner found the fundamental right of procreative autonomy in the 
Equal Protection Clause, but the Supreme Court subsequently reinterpreted 
Skinner as articulating a right deriving from the Due Process Clause.  See, e.g., 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846–51 (1992) 
(opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); Carey v. Population Services 
Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 152–53.
92. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
93. Roe, 410 U.S. 113; Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
94. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
95. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).
96. Id. at 2600.
97. Nicolas, supra note 34, at 348.
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son the Obergefell majority wove due process and equal protection 
together was because of the positive-negative rights issue implicat-
ed by a right to marry.98  Nicolas suggests the majority used due 
process to protect the negative rights at issue and equal protection 
to protect the positive rights.99  Furthermore, Nicolas notes that 
the Court has “not always been careful about distinguishing those 
substantive rights protected by the Due Process Clause and those 
protected by the Equal Protection Clause.”100
Importantly, Nicolas recognizes that fundamental rights derived 
from the Due Process Clause may differ from those derived from the 
Equal Protection Clause.101  He argues that, in contrast to enforcing 
rights with formulaic tests under the Due Process Clause, the Court 
has failed to explain its criteria for finding rights fundamental for the 
purpose of equal protection analysis.102  Nicolas observes that there 
are three lines of cases in which fundamental rights have relied in 
whole or in part upon the Equal Protection Clause, even after the 
Court recharacterized equal protection cases, like Skinner v. Okla-
homa103 and Griswold v. Connecticut,104 as due process cases.105  These 
three lines are the asserted fundamental rights to vote,106 to marry,107 
98. Id.  Nicolas has further argued that as a matter of due process, the 
right to marry is not its own distinct fundamental right but is rather derivative 
of the negative fundamental right to procreative and nonprocreative sexual ac-
tivity without state interference.  In other words, because of the historic nature 
of marriage as the only gateway to lawful sexual activity (in light of the prohi-
bition of fornication), the “right to marry” under the Due Process Clause was 
actually the negative right to sex without criminal sanction.
99. Id. at 343–52 (arguing the Court was on solid precedential ground 
when it opted to invoke the Equal Protection Clause in tandem with the Due 
Process Clause in declaring that the same-sex marriage bans interfered with the 
fundamental right to marry).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 351 (noting the criteria for a right being denominated under the 
Equal Protection Clause is somewhat opaque in contrast with the structured 
formula for recognizing fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause).
102. Id.
103. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding 
compulsory sterilization of criminals unconstitutional where the sterilization 
law treats similar crimes differently).
104. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a constitutional 
right for married couples to use contraception).
105. Id. at 349–52.
106. Nicolas, supra note 34, at 349 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 
(2000); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.74 (1973); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 
15, 395 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1969); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 
(1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)).
107. Nicolas, supra note 34, at 350 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 
381–87 (1978); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–95 (1987); Obergefell v. Hodges, 
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and to a base level of education.108  In these equal protection cases, 
the Court considered or applied heightened scrutiny, not because of 
the nature of the classification—none involved suspect or quasisus-
pect classifications—but rather, because of the fundamental nature 
of the impacted right.  Nicolas argues these cases are tied togeth-
er not only because they involved a targeted denial of fundamental 
rights, but also because they each involved positive rights.
Believing that Obergefell’s equal protection jurisprudence is 
well-grounded in precedent, Nicolas theorizes that the Court will 
identify a right as fundamental for the purposes of equal protection:
 [W]hen a government-created right serves as a precursor 
to a sufficiently large array of rights, then denial of the gov-
ernment-created “gateway” right is tantamount to denying a 
class of persons what is in effect a cornerstone of modern cit-
izenship, effectively relegating them to a second-class status.  
Under those circumstances, the “gateway” right will be denom-
inated fundamental under the Equal Protection Clause.109
To Nicolas, government-induced relegation is the very digni-
tary harm referenced and deemed unconstitutional in Obergefell. 
This differs from Yoshino’s antisubordination doctrine in that 
Yoshino views antisubordination as a liberty derived from the Due 
Process Clause.  Here, Nicolas considers antisubordination to be an 
equal protection issue.
Nicolas observes that the two rights the Court has identified 
as positive fundamental rights protected by the Equal Protection 
Clause—the right to vote and the right to marry—both serve as 
gateways to the exercise of other constitutional rights.110  Nicolas 
also acknowledges that the Court’s conclusion in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez,111 that education was not a 
fundamental right for equal protection purposes, indicates that the 
relative importance of a right does not render it fundamental for 
equal protection purposes.112  But, Nicolas offered little explanation 
as to why voting rights and marriage rights constitute protected 
gateways, while education does not.  The Rodriguez Court explicitly 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–604 (2015)).
108. Nicolas, supra note 34, at 349–50 (citing Rodriguez and Papasan v. 
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284–85 (1986)).
109. Nicolas, supra note 34, at 351.
110. Id. at 351–52 (e.g., “those denied the franchise for a given office like-
wise lack the ability to influence the political process that in turn effects the 
entire panoply of civil and political rights within a polity”).
111. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
112. Id. at 30 (“the importance of a service performed by the State does 
not determine whether it must be regarded as fundamental for purposes of 
examination under the Equal Protection Clause”).
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rejected the contention that education is a fundamental personal 
right because it “bears a peculiarly close relationship to other rights 
and liberties accorded protection under the Constitution.”113  The 
Court opined:
 the key to discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ 
is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal signif-
icance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing.  Nor 
is it to be found by weighing whether education is as import-
ant as the right to travel.  Rather, the answer lies in assessing 
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution.114
The Court found no such explicit or implicit right in the Constitution.
Importantly, Rodriguez was not about selective exclusion 
from education, but about funding for schools.  The Court refused 
to find equality of funding for education a fundamental right, but, 
as Nicolas notes, the Court left open the possibility that there may 
be a right to some “base level” of education.115  Ostensibly, selective 
exclusion from a base level of education could potentially vio-
late equal protection, but those facts were not before the Court in 
Rodriguez.116
Recognizing that fundamental rights protected by equal pro-
tection can be different than fundamental rights protected by due 
process allows courts to protect equality in government-provid-
ed privileges (positive rights) without mandating that government 
provide those privileges.  For example, an equal protection right to 
basic education does not impose upon government a requirement 
to provide basic education to all children; it simply requires that 
when the government does provide it, it be provided equally.  This 
approach avoids judicial creation of positive rights, which is espe-
cially important given the universality inherent in declaring a right 
to be fundamental.
Guaranteeing negative rights involves no resource limita-
tions—the government can provide a limitless supply of “leaving 
113. Id. at 35–36 (holding that though education is related to the exercise 
of First Amendment and voting rights, the Court cannot guarantee to the citi-
zenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice).
114. Id. at 33.
115. Nicolas, supra note 34, at 350 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 
284–85 (1986); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36–37) (“Even if it were conceded that 
some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prereq-
uisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the 
present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that 
falls short”).
116. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36–37.
68 Vol. 27.41UCLA WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL
citizens alone” as they exercise their right to privacy,117 abortion,118 
and direct the upbringing of their child.119  By contrast, positive 
rights—the right to something—may require the provision of a 
finite or limited resource, thus limiting the government’s ability to 
provide it.  For example, a positive right to education would require 
government to fund education for all, whether or not it had the 
resources to do so.
In the few instances in which the Supreme Court has identi-
fied a positive fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection 
Clause—specifically, the right to marry and the right to vote—the 
resources required to provide the right to all, rather than to a few, 
do not make provision of the right practically impossible.  So, judi-
cial enforcement of equality does not require the political branches 
to use excessive resources in order to provide the right.  In the mar-
riage context, there are some arguable resource limitations, such 
as staffing sufficient clerks for administrative processing, issu-
ing marriage licenses, and providing judicial resources to address 
marriage-related legal disputes (including marriage dissolution). 
However, when the Court has declared that the fundamental right 
to marriage requires inclusion of a new group, the burden on relat-
ed governmental resources has been marginal.120
C. Obergefell’s Equal Protection
1. The Absence of “Traditional” Equal Protection
While the Obergefell majority made explicit modifications to 
substantive due process analysis, its changes to equal protection 
were largely implicit.  In discussing equal protection, the majori-
ty did not mention any of the traditional tiers of scrutiny nor the 
requirements for satisfying them.  This omission of traditional equal 
protection analysis may seem curious because equal protection 
seemed an obvious basis for deciding Obergefell.  The Court could 
have reached the same conclusion with one of the many traditional 
equal protection tools available.121
117. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
118. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
119. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925).  Notably, this does not include the right to government-funded 
abortion.  See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
120. For example, Virginia could absorb the number of interracial mar-
riages after Loving, California could absorb the few additional marriages by 
prisoners after Safley, and all states can absorb the same-sex marriages follow-
ing Obergefell.
121. For instance, the majority could have decided: (1) that rational basis 
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But Kennedy’s equal protection approach in Obergefell is less 
surprising given the broader trends in equal protection jurispru-
dence at the time and given Kennedy’s focus on due process, rather 
than equal protection, in Lawrence v. Texas.122  As Justice O’Connor 
urged in her Lawrence concurrence, equal protection was an obvi-
ous basis for deciding that a state could not selectively punish only 
one group of people for engaging in sodomy.123  Nevertheless, the 
Lawrence majority instead focused on due process.124
There are several plausible explanations for why Obergefell 
and Lawrence acknowledged equal protection but did not include 
traditional equal protection analysis.  First, the omission may be evi-
dence of the Court’s general shift away from the traditional equal 
protection jurisprudence that focuses on classifications and tiers 
of scrutiny.125  Second, the majorities in Lawrence and Obergefell 
review applies to the classification but that marriage bans were not rational 
because their exclusions were based on animus; (2) that sexual orientation clas-
sifications are suspect or quasisuspect classifications and that such an exclusion 
would not pass intermediate or strict scrutiny; (3) that same-sex marriage bans 
constitute sex discrimination and that such a  ban could not pass intermediate 
scrutiny; or (4) that a fundamental right based on the Equal Protection Clause 
was being selectively infringed and that the infringement could not pass strict 
scrutiny.  Each of these approaches would have yielded the same judgment, 
and yet the Court used none of them.  Instead, the Court noted the existence 
of equal protection concerns with same-sex marriage bans, discussed the rela-
tionship between equal protection and due process (addressed in infra Subpart 
II.B), and then arrived at a conclusory assertion that same-sex marriage bans 
violated the Equal Protection Clause.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2602–04 (2015).
122. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 
747 (2011) (arguing Lawrence was consistent with the Court’s new approach to 
equal protection, which prefers liberty-based dignity claims in order to avoid 
pluralism anxiety); William D. Araiza, Amicus and Its Discontents (unpublished 
manuscript) (last visited Aug. 30, 2018) (on file with the University of Indiana 
School of Law) (noting that animus—the idea that classifications based on gov-
ernment dislike of a particular group are impermissible—has been the only 
significant equal protection jurisprudence development in decades and that 
traditional, political process-based equal protection analysis has disappeared).
123. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 578 (holding petitioners’ “right to liberty under the Due Process 
Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention 
of the government.”).  In Obergefell, Kennedy unconvincingly attempted to re-
cast his opinion in Lawrence as also being based on equal protection (“Law-
rence . . . drew upon principles of liberty and equality to define and protect the 
rights of gays and lesbians.”).  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
125. For instance, the Court has repeatedly declined to use heightened 
scrutiny in cases with sexual orientation classifications, even though sexual 
orientation seems deserving of special protection through heightened scrutiny. 
The majorities in Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell, all failed to identify 
classifications based on sexual orientation as suspect or quasisuspect, despite 
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may have eschewed traditional equal protection analysis because 
an equal protection-based holding does not sufficiently guarantee a 
right.  Specifically, an equal protection-based holding in those cases 
would have permitted states to “level down” by banning all sod-
omy or all marriage, which would have only perpetuated the special 
harm to same sex couples.126  By relying on equal protection and on 
the implicated liberty interests, the Court in Lawrence and 
strong arguments that such classifications meet the traditional criteria courts 
use to determine whether a classification should receive some form of height-
ened scrutiny: 1. Whether classification is based on an immutable characteristic 
possessed by a discrete and insular minority; 2. Whether there is a long histo-
ry of discrimination based on that characteristic; 3. Whether the characteristic 
upon which the discrimination occurs bears any relationship on the ability to 
contribute to/participate in society; and 4. Whether the group being discriminat-
ed against has relative political powerlessness. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603–04; 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75; see, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).  Scholars have identified this trend.  See, e.g., Yoshino, 
supra note 122, at 776–78 (arguing Lawrence was consistent with the Court’s 
new approach to equal protection, which prefers liberty-based dignity claims in 
order to avoid pluralism anxiety); Yoshino, supra note 122, at 757 (noting that 
“[a]t least with respect to federal equal protection jurisprudence, th[e] canon 
[of suspect class analysis] has closed,” and arguing Lawrence was consistent 
with the Court’s new approach to equal protection, which prefers liberty-based 
dignity claims in order to avoid pluralism anxiety); Yoshino, supra note 53, at 
173 (arguing that an equal protection basis alone would have permitted states 
to “level down” and prohibit all sodomy rather than “level up” to permit sod-
omy regardless of the sexual orientation of its participants”); Lawrence Tribe, 
Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 
Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1945 (2004) (noting the “inadequacy of equal protection” 
to decide Lawrence, and advocating a view of the relationship between equal 
protection and due process similar to that the Court had adopted in Lawrence 
and would employ again in Obergefell); Araiza, supra note 122 (noting that an-
imus—the idea that classifications based on government dislike of a particular 
group are impermissible—has been the only significant equal protection juris-
prudence development in decades and that traditional, political process-based 
equal protection analysis has disappeared).
126. This interpretation is supported by Kennedy’s discussion of Loving. 
He notes that the Loving Court first declared Virginia’s anti-miscegenation stat-
ute’s unequal treatment of interracial couples to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, but then continued to hold that that inequality also violated the Due 
Process Clause in that it deprived all citizens in the state of liberty.  Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2603 (citing Loving v. virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).  See also, 
e.g., Yoshino, supra note 53, at 173 (“by basing its ruling on the Due Process 
Clause . . . the Obergefell Court required the equality of the vineyard” rather 
than the “equality of the graveyard”); Tribe, supra note 125, at 1907–15 (equal 
protection alone would have permitted states to ban all sodomy, continuing to 
subordinate and stigmatize gays and lesbians, denying them equal respect and 
equal dignity).
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Obergefell required states to “level up” and protect the right to con-
sensual sodomy and marriage.127
Additionally, we might take Justice Kennedy at his word 
when he concluded that, despite the interconnectedness of the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, “[i]n any particular 
case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right 
in a more accurate and comprehensive way . . . .”128  In Lawrence, 
Kennedy explicitly acknowledged that relying on liberty rationale 
to overturn the statute advanced the interests of both liberty and 
equality.129  And in Obergefell, the primacy and relative length of 
Kennedy’s due process discussion suggests he believed that the 
Due Process Clause “captured the essence of the right,” thus obvi-
ating the need for traditional equal protection analysis.
Finally, the reliance on equal protection principles without a 
traditional equal protection analysis may have intentionally cleared 
the way for Obergefell’s most salient constitutional advancement: 
the idea that dignitary harm through selective exclusion is prohibit-
ed by the Equal Protection Clause.
2. Dignitary Harm as a Constitutional Violation
In focusing on the selective exclusion that was at issue before 
the Court, Obergefell stands for the proposition that a demeaning 
or stigmatizing selective exclusion from a sufficiently important 
right violates the Equal Protection Clause.130  Critics of this position 
may argue that Obergefell did not break new constitutional ground 
because it addressed marriage, a right long-deemed fundamental. 
But the majority went further, declaring that laws imposing stigma 
and injury are themselves prohibited:
127. As Yoshino has noted, this means that the equality concerns impli-
cated in the case were, “against intuition, better served under the Due Process 
Clause than under the Equal Protection Clause.”  Yoshino, supra note 53, at 173.
128. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
129. Liberty advanced both interests, because by articulating the right to 
engage in private consensual sex as a protected liberty interest, all people en-
joyed the right, and the state could not diminish the right for anyone.  By con-
trast, had the Court relied on equality alone, the liberty interest might not have 
been protected.  For example, the state could have prohibited sodomy for all. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (concluding that equality as the foundational princi-
ple might not remove stigma of making protected conduct criminal for all).
130. To be sure, Obergefell was not the first case in which the Court rec-
ognized the stigmatizing injury—the “deprivation of personal dignity”—that 
accompanies denial of equality.  See, e.g., Roberts v. US Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 
625 (1984) (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
250 (1964)) (finding that the fundamental object of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was to “vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies 
denials of equal access to public establishments’”).
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The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long 
have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the cen-
tral meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. 
With that knowledge must come the recognition that laws exclud-
ing same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and 
injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.131
Here, the Court asserts that the Constitution prohibits exclu-
sionary laws that impose stigma and injury.  The Obergefell majority 
repeatedly referenced the stigmatic and demeaning effect of same-
sex marriage bans, focusing on the inequality of exclusion in both 
the due process and equal protection portions of the opinions.
First, within the apparent due process section of the opinion, 
the majority asserted, “Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, 
but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”132  This assertion 
explains why Lawrence’s mere decriminalization of same sex sod-
omy was insufficient to achieve the liberty same sex couples sought 
and suggests that, when the government’s actions effectively “out-
cast” a group, liberty is infringed.  But the “outcasting” government 
action in Obergefell was not the denial of marriage to all, which 
might implicate Yoshino’s antisubordination liberty.133  Instead, 
only same-sex couples were outcast, because only persons desiring 
to marry someone of the same sex were denied the marriage right. 
Thus, the only thing that effectively outcast same-sex couples seek-
ing to marry was deliberate exclusion by the government.
The Court provided additional substance to its observation 
that selective exclusion from a fundamental right imposes uncon-
stitutional stigma and injury when it noted:
As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the 
significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the 
effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in import-
ant respects.  It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock 
them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.134
This suggests that the government’s decision to elevate a 
privilege, while simultaneously excluding some from that right, 
has a constitutionally prohibited demeaning effect on those who 
are excluded.
131. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
132. Id. at 2600.
133. As discussed in Subpart II.B.1 above, Yoshino’s theory of antisubor-
dination liberty is that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses combine 
to guarantee a right to not be subordinated, even by a law that is equally ap-
plied to all.  Thus, denial of marriage to all would implicate the antisubordina-
tion liberty because of its purpose: denial of marriage to same-sex couples.
134. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601–02.
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The final sentence of the due process section serves as a tran-
sition to its equal protection analysis and reinforces the idea that 
selective exclusion from a fundamental right is itself a demeaning 
government action.  The Court observed that “when  .  .  .  sincere, 
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the 
necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself 
on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose 
own liberty is then denied.”135  This quote recalls the Supreme 
Court’s prior equal protection admonition in Palmore v. Sidoti that 
“[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law 
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”136
In its equal protection discussion, the Obergefell majority 
focuses primarily on the right to not be demeaned by one’s gov-
ernment and tries to recast Lawrence as based on equal protection: 
“Lawrence  .  .  .  drew upon principles of liberty and equality to 
define and protect the rights of gays and lesbians, holding the State 
‘cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by mak-
ing their private sexual conduct a crime.’”137  Whether or not this 
is ultimately persuasive, it nonetheless illustrates the Court’s belief 
that demeaning one’s existence through selective exclusion violates 
equal protection.  Further, the Obergefell majority asserted:
 The marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in 
essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits 
afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercis-
ing a fundamental right.  Especially against a long history of 
disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex cou-
ples of the right to marry works a grave and continuing harm.  
The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to 
disrespect and subordinate them.  And the Equal Protection 
Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjustified 
infringement of the fundamental right to marry.138
Once again, the Court was concerned with the inequality, dis-
respect, and subordination borne of selective exclusion, especially 
in the context of a “long history of disapproval.”
Kennedy’s use of “dignity” at oral argument in Obergefell 
sheds further light on his understanding of the term and its con-
stitutional significance.  In questioning the attorney representing 
the states imposing same-sex marriage bans, Kennedy asserted, “I 
thought [dignity] was the whole purpose of marriage.  It bestows 
135. Id. at 2602.
136. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
137. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
578 (2003)).
138. Id.
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dignity on both man and woman in a traditional marriage . . . .  It’s 
dignity-bestowing and [gay and lesbian couples] say they want to 
have that . . . same ennoblement.”  This framing suggests that, for 
Kennedy, dignity is achieved through provision of the fundamental 
right at issue, not that dignity is a constitutionally protected right 
itself.  The Constitution does not confer or guarantee dignity; the 
state confers it through the institution of marriage.  And equal dig-
nity is the notion that when the state bestows dignity, it must bestow 
it equally.  Equal dignity is thus an equality-focused principle.
As explained above, the Obergefell majority observes that 
when the government attaches great significance to a right that it 
provides, exclusion from that right can be demeaning.  Thus, the 
degree of importance attached to the positive right informs the 
degree of dignitary harm caused by the exclusion.  Obergefell’s 
equal protection advancement is this: protected rights for equal 
protection purposes include those privileges (positive rights) to 
which the government attaches such significance and importance 
that selective exclusion from them demeans or stigmatizes the 
excluded.139  When this occurs, the government must provide a com-
pelling justification for the exclusion.  That is, the Equal Protection 
Clause guarantees a right to not be demeaned by one’s government 
through unjustified selective exclusion from an important privilege 
the government has decided to bestow.
Obergefell suggests that the Equal Protection Clause protects 
not only the positive rights that have attained “gateway status,”140 
but also those positive rights to which the government has attached 
great significance.  The right must be so significant that exclusion 
demeans or stigmatizes those excluded.  Thus, it is both the relative 
importance of a right and the demeaning and stigmatizing effect of 
selective exclusion from that right that makes the exclusion worthy 
of increased judicial attention under the Equal Protection Clause.
In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court was clear that “importance” 
alone is insufficient to make a right “fundamental” under equal pro-
tection.  Despite the Court’s prior recognition of the importance of 
education, the Rodriguez majority explicitly found that differences 
in funding in different districts did not deprive students of a fun-
damental right to education.141  However, the Rodriguez dissenters 
139. Id. at 2602.
140. Id.; See supra Subpart II.B.2.
141. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, 
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“(p)roviding public 
schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State”).
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recognized the nexus between asserted positive rights and constitu-
tionally guaranteed rights:
 “[F]undamentality” is, in large measure, a function of the 
right’s importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights 
which are in fact constitutionally guaranteed.  Thus, “(a)s the 
nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the 
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional 
interest becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial 
scrutiny applied when the interest is infringed on a discrimi-
natory basis must be adjusted accordingly.”  Here, there can 
be no doubt that education is inextricably linked to the right 
to participate in the electoral process and to the rights of free 
speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment.142
The Rodriguez majority and dissent simply could not agree 
that education was sufficiently related to other constitutionally 
guaranteed rights and thus fundamental.
Though Obergefell does not address Rodriguez explicitly, it 
nevertheless suggests a subtle shift from Rodriguez.  In his dissent, 
Chief Justice Roberts recognized this shift, citing Rodriguez for 
the proposition that “[o]ur cases have consistently refused to allow 
litigants to convert the shield provided by constitutional liberties 
into a sword to demand positive entitlements from the State.”143 
But this misapprehends the nature of the protection of a funda-
mental right under the Equal Protection Clause rather than under 
the Due Process Clause.  Under the view presented here, plaintiffs 
seeking equality in provision of rights do not seek to turn a due pro-
cess-provided right into an entitlement; rather, they seek equality in 
provision of a privilege that the government has decided to provide 
and to which the government has attached significance.
Unlike the situation in Obergefell, Rodriguez was not about 
complete exclusion from the asserted fundamental right.  Indeed, 
the Rodriguez Court explicitly recognized a clear distinction 
142. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 63 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall further noted that because the majority 
suggested that only interests guaranteed by the Constitution are fundamental 
for purposes of equal protection analysis, and since it rejected the contention 
that public education is fundamental, it followed that the Court concludes that 
public education is not constitutionally guaranteed.  Marshall agreed the Court 
had never deemed the provision of free public education to be required by the 
Constitution, but asserted “the fundamental importance of education is amply 
indicated by the prior decisions of this Court, by the unique status accorded 
public education by our society, and by the close relationship between educa-
tion and some of our most basic constitutional values.”
143. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, CJ, dissenting (citing, inter alia, 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35–37)).
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between unequal distribution of a privilege and an absolute exclu-
sion from a privilege, conceding the case may have been different 
had the plaintiffs been excluded altogether from education.144  The 
Rodriguez formula for finding a fundamental right to be protected 
by the Equal Protection Clause might be articulated as:
Importance of Right + Constitutional Nexus = Fundamental Right.
Obergefell offers an additional formula for finding a funda-
mental right protected by the Equal Protection Clause:
Importance of Right + Demeaning or Stigmatic Effect of Exclusion 
= Fundamental Right.
Because nearly all laws assert what behavior is and is not 
acceptable, and thus pose the risk of imposing stigma, it is diffi-
cult to determine when selective exclusion from a positive right 
rises to the level of constitutionally prohibited stigma and injury. 
The Obergefell majority offers no means of determining when the 
demeaning effect of inequality rises to the level of sufficient stigma 
and injury such that the right is fundamental.  But this is consis-
tent with the majority’s readoption of Justice Harlan’s common law 
approach to evaluation of due process-based fundamental rights 
claims: courts will have to determine the demeaning effect of selec-
tive exclusion as cases arise.145
Though the Obergefell majority did not offer a formula or 
test for assessing alleged dignitary harms, it provided some clues 
regarding appropriate considerations.  First, the Court was particu-
larly concerned with the role of the state in attaching significance to 
a right that not everyone was permitted to enjoy.  The Court repeat-
edly noted “all the benefits” states afford married couples.146  And 
beyond the practical benefits, Justice Kennedy suggested that the 
144. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20 (noting that in prior cases where the Court 
had invalidated wealth discrimination, the members of the disadvantaged class 
“shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they 
were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence, 
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that 
benefit”); Id. at 36–37 (noting that the facts of the case were not that plaintiffs 
suffered “absolute denial of educational opportunities,” but rather “only rela-
tive differences”).
145. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602; See supra Subpart II.A.1.
146. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602, 2604.  The Court identified the 
governmentally provided rights, benefits, and responsibilities of marriage, in-
cluding: “taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession; 
spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision-mak-
ing authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and 
death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; work-
ers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, support, and 
visitation rules.”
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state confers dignity and ennoblement on married couples through 
the institution of marriage.147  Thus, to determine whether dignitary 
harm through exclusion is prohibited by the Constitution, one may 
first ask whether it is the government’s attachment of significance 
to the right that causes the dignitary harm.
Second, the Court suggests that judges look at history and 
context to assess whether selective exclusion from a right consti-
tutes prohibited disrespect and subordination.  The Court asserts 
that exclusion from a fundamental right is a constitutionally prohib-
ited harm to same sex couples, “[e]specially against a long history 
of disapproval of their relationships.”  When a selective exclusion 
aligns with longstanding societal discomfort with, or discrimination 
against, those who are excluded, that context suggests stigma.148 
And identity-based exclusions are more suspect because, unlike 
ability-based or behaviorally-based exclusions, they often bear lit-
tle relationship to the purported purpose of the exclusion.149
Finally, the Obergefell majority’s conclusion that the “Equal 
Protection Clause, like the Due Process Clause, prohibits this unjus-
tified infringement”150 suggests an additional procedural step and 
consideration when assessing whether a government-imposed 
dignitary harm is constitutionally prohibited: there must be an 
opportunity for the government to justify the infringement.  The 
majority opinion’s relative lack of discussion of government justi-
fications for same-sex marriage bans might suggest that selective 
exclusions from fundamental rights are per se void.  But the major-
ity’s own words explicitly afford the government the opportunity 
to demonstrate that what appears to be a stigmatic exclusion is 
not; or, if it is, to demonstrate why excluding in a demeaning way 
is necessary.  Moreover, in balancing the individual’s right to not 
be demeaned against the government’s interest, courts’ analyses 
of government justifications for the selective exclusion can both 
help measure the extent of dignitary harm and then determine 
whether the dignitary harm is necessary.  While all exclusions are 
clearly demeaning to those excluded, when the government’s justi-
fication for the exclusion is founded on sound, noninvidious bases, 
147. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct 2584 (2015) 
(No. 14-556).
148. This is consistent with a longstanding concern of traditional classifi-
cation-oriented equal protection jurisprudence, which included the history of 
discrimination in its list of factors to determine whether to apply heightened 
scrutiny.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985).
149. Id.
150. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
78 Vol. 27.41UCLA WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL
the dignitary harm of the exclusion is weaker and the government 
infringement on the fundamental right may be justified.
Obergefell provided an example of this kind of analysis when 
it discussed the fundamental nature of marriage and found the 
states’ exclusion of same-sex couples to be unjustified.  The Court 
identified four principles and traditions that demonstrated why the 
marriage right was fundamental and determined that none of the 
four justified the exclusion of same-sex couples, thereby concluding 
that the states had failed to justify the same-sex marriage bans.151
III. Obergefell Applied to Transgender Military Ban
A. The Transgender Ban
On July 26, 2017, the President issued a statement via Twitter 
announcing:
After consultation with my Generals and military experts, 
please be advised that the United States government will not 
accept or allow .  .  .  [t]ransgender individuals to serve in any 
capacity in the U.S. military.  Our military must be focused 
on decisive and overwhelming . . . victory and cannot be bur-
dened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that 
transgender in the military would entail.152
These tweets were followed by a Presidential Memorandum 
to the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security (Presidential 
Memorandum I) about one month later.153  The tweet and Presiden-
tial Memorandum I contravened an announcement issued in June 
2016 by then-President Barack Obama’s Department of Defense154 
allowing openly transgender individuals to enlist in the military and 
151. The Court noted the right to marry is fundamental because: 1) the 
right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of indi-
vidual autonomy; 2) marriage supports a two-person union unlike any other in 
its importance to the committed individuals; 3) marriage safeguards children 
and families (and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, pro-
creation, and education); and 4) marriage is the keystone of the social order 
and the “foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be 
neither civilization nor progress.”  Id. at 2599–602.
152. See, e.g., July 26, 2017 Twitter Announcement, supra note 7 (barring 
transgender persons from serving in the military).
153. Memorandum on Military Service by Transgender Individuals, 
2017 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 587 (Aug. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Presidential 
Memorandum I].
154. See DoD I 1300.28, In-service Transition for Service Members 
Identifying as Transgender (June 30, 2016); Directive-type Memorandum 
(DTM) 16–005, Military Service of Transgender Service Members (June 30, 
2016).
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prohibiting the discharge of service members based solely on their 
gender identities.
Presidential Memorandum I effected the following changes. 
First, it indefinitely extended the prohibition on transgender indi-
viduals entering the military.155  Second, Presidential Memorandum 
I required the military to authorize the discharge of transgen-
der service members  no later than March 23, 2018.156  Third, the 
President directed the Secretaries to return to the pre-June 2016 
policy until “a sufficient basis exists upon which to conclude that 
terminating that policy and practice would not have the negative 
effects discussed above.”157  The Secretaries were given until Febru-
ary 21, 2018, to submit a plan to revert to the pre-June 2016 policy, 
which Presidential Memorandum I described as a policy that “gen-
erally prohibited openly transgender individuals” from serving in 
the military.158
On February 22, 2018, the Secretary of Defense issued a mem-
orandum (SecDef Memo)159 to the President relaying his findings 
and decision regarding military service by transgender individuals. 
The Secretary of Defense also attached a report on military ser-
vice by transgender persons (DoD Report).160  The SecDef Memo 
defines “transgender” as “those persons whose gender identity 
differs from their biological sex.”161  The Secretary of Defense rec-
ommended the disqualification from military service of transgender 
persons who “require or have undergone gender transition.”162  He 
also recommended the disqualification from military service 
of transgender persons with “a history or diagnosis of gender 
155. Presidential Memorandum I, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.  Further, the memorandum directed the Secretaries to “maintain 
the currently effective policy regarding accession of transgender individuals 
into military service beyond January 1, 2018, until such time as the Secretary of 
Defense, after consulting with the Secretary of Homeland Security, provides a 
recommendation to the contrary that [the President finds] convincing . . . .”
158. Id.
159. Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. James M. Mattis to President 
Donald J. Trump: Military Service by Transgender Individuals (2018), 
https://media.defense.gov/2018/Mar/23/2001894037/-1/-1/0/MILITARY- 
SERVICE-BY-TRANSGENDER-INDIVIDUALS.PDF [https://perma.cc/
JP62-E54J] [hereinafter SecDef Memo].
160. Id.; Department of Def., Defense Report and Recommendations on 
Military Service by Transgender Persons (2018), https://partner- mco- archive.
s3.amazonaws.com/client_files/1521898539.pdf [perma.cc/VF9X-P3QT] [herein-
after DoD Report].
161. SecDef Memo, supra note 159.
162. Id.
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dysphoria.”163  The SecDef Memo claimed “[a] subset of transgender 
persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria experience discomfort 
with their biological sex, resulting in significant distress or difficulty 
functioning.  Persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria often seek 
to transition their gender through prescribed medical treatments 
intended to relieve the distress and impaired functioning associated 
with their diagnosis.”164  The SecDef Memo suggests allowing indi-
viduals with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria to serve, but 
only under the following circumstances:
(1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their 
biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diag-
nosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be 
retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain 
deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) cur-
rently serving Service members who have been diagnosed 
with gender dysphoria since the previous administration’s pol-
icy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, 
may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive 
medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria.165
The SecDef Memo prohibits transgender people—including 
those who have neither transitioned nor been diagnosed with gen-
der dysphoria—from serving, unless they are “willing and able to 
adhere to all standards associated with their biological sex.”166  For 
military members, this would include wearing uniforms consistent 
with those assigned to members of their biological sex, referring 
to oneself on official documents as being of their biologically 
assigned sex, and meeting physical fitness standards of their biolog-
ically assigned sex.  The SecDef Memo also notes that exempting 
transgender persons from the mental health, physical health, and 
sex-based standards that apply to all service members, including 
transgender service members without gender dysphoria, “could 
undermine readiness, disrupt unit cohesion, and impose an unrea-
sonable burden on the military that is not conducive to military 
effectiveness and lethality . . . . ”167
After receiving the Secretary of Defense’s recommendation, 
the President issued a new memorandum (Presidential Memoran-
dum II) revoking Presidential Memorandum I and authorizing 
the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to “implement 
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Karnoski v. Trump, 2018 WL 1784464, at *6,  *21 (W.D. 
Wash. 2018), vacated and remanded by 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2019).
167. SecDef Memo, supra note 159.
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any appropriate policies concerning military service by transgen-
der individuals.” 168  Thus, Presidential Memorandum II effectively 
approved the Secretary of Defense’s implementation plan.
B. Obergefellian Due Process and the Transgender Ban
1. Obergefell’s Approach to Identifying the Fundamental 
Right Implicated by Military Service Exclusion
a. Articulating the Right at the Appropriate Level of 
Generality
As discussed, Obergefell enshrined Justice Harlan’s com-
mon law approach, in which courts exercise “reasoned judgment 
in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State 
must accord them its respect.”169  While this liberates the judiciary 
to identify new fundamental rights, it is difficult to predict wheth-
er judges will exercise greater discretion in the context of military 
service exclusion.  Using lessons from cases challenging DADT 
and military exclusion cases currently being litigated, this Subpart 
details how courts can use Obergefell to identify the fundamental 
right to military service.
To assess the fundamentality of an asserted liberty interest, 
the interest at issue must first be identified.  Obergefell’s clarification 
that a right does not need to be articulated “carefully” opens the 
door to the recognition of new fundamental rights, some of which 
might apply to military service.  Whether an exclusion from the mil-
itary constitutes an infringement on a fundamental right will rely on 
a fact-intensive analysis of the military exclusion and the asserted 
liberty interest.  Given the myriad bases for exclusion from military 
service, from childhood asthma to bedwetting to various physical 
and mental health concerns, and the ways in which those exclusions 
may be articulated, it is difficult to discuss comprehensively what 
specific liberty interests might be infringed by a particular exclu-
sion.  However, exclusions that are currently being litigated can 
serve as a helpful way to understand the tools Obergefell offers to 
excluded individuals who wish to challenge the exclusion.
168. Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security Regarding Military Service by Transgen-
der Individuals, 83 Fed. Reg. 13,367 (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.
gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-defense-secre-
tary-homeland-security-regarding-military-service-transgender-individuals 
[perma.cc/HG93-PSTZ] (hereinafter Presidential Memorandum II).
169. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (citing Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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DADT was challenged and litigated after Lawrence, but 
before Obergefell.  In two prominent cases, federal circuit courts 
addressed claims that DADT violated liberty interests protected 
by the Due Process Clause.  In Witt v. Dep’t. of the Air Force, the 
plaintiff challenging DADT asserted that the policy infringed on 
the right to engage in private, consensual, same sex sexual conduct. 
This articulation rested directly on Lawrence, which held that the 
Texas statute banning same sex sodomy impermissibly infringed 
on the right to engage in private, consensual same sex sexual con-
duct.  This articulation of the right at issue had the added benefit 
of responding directly to the infringement by DADT: that same sex 
sexual conduct served as the basis for exclusion.  Without stating 
that this was the appropriate articulation of the right at issue, or 
whether that right was “fundamental,” the Ninth Circuit allowed 
the substantive due process claim to move forward, requiring the 
district court to apply heightened, but not strict, scrutiny.170  In Cook 
v. Gates, the Second Circuit settled on a similar articulation of the 
liberty interest established in Lawrence: “we are convinced that 
Lawrence recognized that adults maintain a protected liberty inter-
est to engage in certain ‘consensual sexual intimacy in the home.’”171
In both cases, the plaintiffs’ focus on actions rather than identi-
ty is consistent with prior substantive due process jurisprudence.  This 
line of jurisprudence has generally focused on one’s right to engage 
in actions that are consistent with one’s identity, not on the person’s 
identity itself.  For example, the right at issue in Loving was not artic-
ulated as a right to be a different race than one’s spouse, but rather a 
right to select and marry one’s spouse, regardless of their race.172  The 
right at issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey was not the right to be someone who does not want a baby or 
to be nonpregnant, but rather the right to have an abortion without 
undue burden imposed by the government.173  The right at issue in 
Glucksberg was not the right to be dead, but rather the right to kill 
oneself with assistance.174  The right in Lawrence was not the right 
170. Witt v. Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that “when the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and pri-
vate lives of homosexuals, in a manner that implicates the rights identified in 
Lawrence, the government must advance an important governmental interest, 
the intrusion must significantly further that interest, and the intrusion must be 
necessary to further that interest.  In other words, for the third factor, a less 
intrusive means must be unlikely to achieve substantially the government’s 
interest.”).
171. Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2008).
172. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
173. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
174. 521 U.S. at 723.
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to be gay, but rather the right to engage in intimacy in the privacy of 
one’s home, whether the intimacy is with another person of the same 
or different sex.  Importantly, the right at issue in Obergefell was not 
the right to be gay, but rather whether the right to marry includes the 
right to marry someone of the same sex.
When articulating the right being infringed by government 
action, it is critical to define the behavior the government is pro-
hibiting or limiting.  In the case of the revised transgender ban, 
persons are prohibited from military service if they undergo physi-
cal gender transition or have experienced gender dysphoria within 
the past 36 months.  Additionally, members are required to serve in 
their biologically assigned gender, which includes compliance with 
a number of gender-specific regulations.  Thus, the transgender ban 
infringes on one’s ability to physically alter one’s body via surgical 
and medical treatments, to dress and appear as one chooses, to be 
held to physical standards consistent with one’s self-identified gen-
der, and to live with others of the same gender.
Thus far in the litigation of the transgender ban cases, plaintiffs 
have articulated the infringed fundamental right in similar ways:
(1) The right to “live authentically in accord with their gen-
der identity.”175
(2) The right to “live in accord with one’s gender.”176
(3) The right to “personal autonomy,” which “includes the 
right of every person, including those who are transgender, to live 
in accord with their gender identity.”177
The plaintiffs’ articulation of the infringed fundamental 
rights conforms with the Obergefell majority’s understanding of 
how asserted rights should be articulated: while the plaintiffs do 
not articulate the rights with the highest level of specificity, they 
“carefully” describe the rights.178  That is, plaintiffs have avoided 
articulations of the right that are too specific and too broad.
175. Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14, Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP 
(W.D. Wash. 2018).  Plaintiffs also assert that “[a] person’s gender identity—
their internalized, inherent sense of what their sex is—is fundamental.”
176. Pls.’ Appl. for Prelim. Inj. at 22, Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 
(D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-1597).
177. Pls.’ Notice of Mot. and Mot. for Prelim. Inj.; Mem. Of P,& A. in Supp. 
Thereof at 22, Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 17–1799 JGB (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 
2017).
178. Of course, in Glucksberg, the Court had already insisted that rights 
be “carefully” articulated, but Obergefell clarified that Glucksberg required a 
“careful” articulation of rights, not what some had argued Glucksberg required, 
which was articulation of rights at their most specific level of generality/ab-
straction.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).  In the transgender 
ban cases, the plaintiffs have articulated the infringed right broadly enough to 
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At the lowest level of generality, the right at issue may have 
been articulated as the right to express the gender opposite of one’s 
assignment and the right to transform one’s body to conform with 
one’s sense of gender identity.  But articulated that way, the right 
clearly would have run into trouble with the second prong of the 
traditional Glucksberg test, which requires that the right be one 
protected as fundamental in the view of history and tradition.  But 
this is precisely the approach that the Obergefell majority rejects, 
noting that “if rights were defined by who exercised them in the 
past, then received practices could serve as their own continued jus-
tification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”179 
In other words, the most specific articulation of the right is inher-
ently circular, answering its own question.
The right could also be articulated more generally than 
plaintiffs have, as the fundamental right to identity.  The Oberge-
fell majority notes constitutionally protected liberties “extend to 
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and auton-
omy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and 
beliefs.”180  The majority also asserted that the liberty protected by 
due process “allow[s] persons, within a lawful realm, to define and 
express their identity.”181
This broad language was not lost on the plaintiffs in one recent 
case challenging the military transgender ban.  Citing Obergefell, 
the plaintiffs noted that the Supreme Court has consistently held 
that “the ability independently to define one’s identity” is “central 
to any concept of liberty.”182  However, though “autonomy of self” 
and a right to identity were principles underlying the liberty inter-
ests identified in Obergefell and in prior cases like Lawrence183 and 
Roberts v. uS Jaycees,184 the Supreme Court has never specifically 
encompass the various ways in which the transgender ban infringes on more 
specific rights.  Notably, the plaintiffs’ version of the affected right is unitary, 
though arguably “the ban” is multifaceted and the infringed rights are, too. 
While the ban has the effect of prohibiting military service by nearly all trans-
gender individuals, it operates through more specific prohibitions.  Ostensibly, 
a court could evaluate each prohibition individually, possibly finding only some 
of the prohibitions infringe on a fundamental right.
179.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
180. Id. at 2597.  Though we can catalog which “certain personal choices 
central to individual dignity and autonomy” have been identified by the Court 
in the past, the catalog remains perpetually incomplete.
181. Id. at 2593.
182. Stockman, 2017 WL 9732572, at *15 (2017) (citing Roberts v. US Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)).
183. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 
(2003).
184. 468 U.S. at 618 (protecting personal relationships from unwarranted 
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held that there is “a fundamental right to identity.”  In fact, the 
Obergefell majority carefully characterized the precedent regarding 
fundamental rights as protecting “certain personal choices central 
to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that 
define personal identity and beliefs” and “certain specific rights 
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity.”185  The inclusion of the qualifying phrase “certain specific 
rights” recognizes there is a difference between specific rights that 
flow from identity—rights the Court has previously identified—and 
a broader, more abstract, “right to identity.”  Articulating a right to 
identity takes the principle underlying previously held rights and 
makes the principle itself the right.  This goes well beyond what Jus-
tice Harlan supported in Poe and Griswold,186 what Justice Souter 
counseled in Glucksberg,187 and what the majority did in Obergefell.
Far from being “carefully described,” a “right to identity” is 
the most abstract articulation of the right at issue.  This articula-
tion of the right violates Justices Souter’s and Harlan’s warnings, 
that were imported by the Obergefell majority: the asserted liberty 
interest should be described in a manner that is sufficiently broad 
to cover the claim at hand, but not so broad as to threaten all gov-
ernment regulation in the area.188
In addition to numerous practical problems with formally 
declaring an overly broad “right to identity,”189  asserting a “right to 
state interference “safeguards the ability independently to define one’s identity 
that is central to any concept of liberty”).
185. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593.
186. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
187. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766–67 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring in judgment).  Justice Souter cited Harlan’s Poe dissent to observe 
that “the kind and degree of justification that a sensitive judge would demand 
of a State would depend on the importance of the interest being asserted by the 
individual.”  Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
188. For example, Justice Harlan explained that the marital right to use 
contraceptives within the privacy of the marital bedroom was supported by a 
principle that distinguished of its own force between areas in which govern-
ment traditionally had regulated (extramarital sexual relations) and those in 
which it had not (private marital intimacies).  And even in Obergefell, the ma-
jority offered reasons why the right to marry was fundamental; they were not 
premised on identity, but rather on the importance of marriage.  Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. at 2594.
189. First, many laws impact a broadly claimed right to identity, which 
would lead to an explosion of fundamental rights litigation that the Supreme 
Court is unlikely to permit.  Second, distinguishing genuine identity claims (e.g., 
gender identity) from feigned or unimportant identity claims (e.g., the right 
to drive at whatever speed one wishes due to one’s identity as a “fast driv-
er”) would require courts to engage in a near-impossible genuineness inquiry. 
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identity” as a basis for entering the military runs counter to a cen-
tral feature of the military, which prides itself on training members 
not to view themselves as individuals, but as part of a cohesive unit. 
Indeed, the military’s practice of repressing individual identity has 
been upheld by the Supreme Court.190  Thus, asserting a broad right 
to identity as the basis for a right to military service would permit 
the government to rely on traditional defenses of military excep-
tionalism and military deference to justify the exclusion.
Fortunately, the plaintiffs in the transgender ban cases have 
settled on the optimal articulation of the right at issue: the right to 
live in accordance with one’s identity.  This right strikes a balance 
between the circularity of the most specific articulation and the 
overinclusiveness of the broadest.  Moreover, it focuses on behav-
ior rather than identity, which is the proper focus of liberty claims. 
Finally, it aligns with Obergefell’s holding that certain expressions 
of identity may be fundamental.
b. Evaluating the Importance of the Asserted Right in 
Light of History and Tradition
As discussed above, the second prong of the Glucksberg test 
was also loosened in Obergefell.  Though history and tradition were 
not entirely discarded, the Court maintained that “rights come not 
from ancient sources alone.”191  The majority entirely ignored the 
Glucksberg requirement that rights be “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,” suggesting it is a permissible, though not a manda-
tory, consideration.  In place of a formalistic history and tradition 
test, the Obergefell majority explored the societal importance of 
marriage, with significant grounding in history and tradition.
Even without the history and tradition constraint, it is easy 
to see how the articulation of the implicated right can determine 
its fundamentality.  The most specific articulations of the asserted 
right would be hard to defend as important.  For example, it is hard 
to find significant evidence of societal importance attached to the 
Attaching legal significance to asserted identities is complicated because of the 
potential that asserted identities may conflict with the underlying purposes of 
many laws.  For example, accepting for legal purposes one’s asserted “age iden-
tity,” rather than biological age, would have significant consequences for the 
safety of minors, the elderly, and all affected by their actions.  If living in ac-
cordance with one’s identity is in fact a fundamental right, it is easy to imagine 
identity-based exceptions to myriad laws.
190. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) (restrictions on mili-
tary speech did not violate the First Amendment because the Court “has long 
recognized that the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from 
civilian society”); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (military officer 
could be ordered not to wear religious headgear while on duty and in uniform).
191. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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“right of a transgender person to surgically alter their reproduc-
tive organs to be those of the opposite biological sex.”  With just a 
slightly more abstract articulation of the issue, however, the right’s 
fundamentality becomes clear.  For example, the right to bodi-
ly integrity and the right to make physical choices regarding one’s 
body are already recognized as “fundamental,” as some of the key 
cases in the substantive due process pantheon make clear.192
2. Applying Obergefell’s New (Old) Form of Heightened 
Scrutiny
Just as it is difficult to predict how or whether judges will 
exercise greater discretion in identifying fundamental rights, it 
is difficult to predict what heightened scrutiny will entail under 
Obergefell’s new due process approach.  As noted above, military 
service exclusion cases have already explored whether heightened 
scrutiny applied to “important,” rather than “fundamental” inter-
ests, and what that heightened scrutiny looked like.  Obergefell did 
not answer these questions.
Assuming an exclusionary policy infringes on a fundamen-
tal liberty interest, under the new Obergefell-Harlan approach, 
the government must provide “sufficient justification” to withstand 
whichever level of scrutiny the court applies.193  In the transgender 
ban litigation, the government has asserted the following interests:
(1) “At least some transgender individuals suffer from medical 
conditions that could impede the performance of their duties.”
(2) Certain medical conditions “may limit the deployability of 
transgender individuals as well as impose additional costs on 
the armed forces.”
(3) The presence of transgender individuals in the military 
would harm “unit cohesion.”194
Thus, under an Obergefell approach, a court should examine 
the proffered justifications for the exclusions and determine wheth-
er they are “sufficient” to justify infringement on a fundamental 
right.  This could prove to be the plaintiffs’ greatest hurdle, as most 
reasons for exclusion from military service rely on these bases: mil-
itary readiness, deployability, and cost.  Moreover, as noted above, 
judicial deference in the realm of national security might lead a 
court to accept any “national defense” justifications put forth by the 
military.  For example, the military accession regulations identify 
192. See, e.g., Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Cruzan 
v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261; Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
193. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
194. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and Opp’n to Pls’ Appl. for Prelim. Inj. at 
31–33, Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-1597).
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medical conditions that are service disqualifying on the bases of 
military readiness, deployability, and cost.195  However, the evidence 
available when the transgender ban was instituted runs contrary to 
the readiness, deployability, and cost justifications offered by the 
government for the ban.196  Because the government’s evidence 
supporting the transgender ban is weak, the level of scrutiny a court 
applies will likely be dispositive.  That is, if a court applies height-
ened scrutiny, the government would be forced to provide real 
evidence, rather than hypothetical assertions, to support its claims, 
a burden it is unlikely to be able to meet.
C. “Obergefellian Equal Protection” and the Transgender 
Military Ban
As noted above, Obergefell does little to change understand-
ing of traditional equal protection analysis.  Scholars,197 plaintiffs,198 
and judges199 have advanced strong arguments that the ban violates 
equal protection using traditional equal protection jurisprudence. 
These arguments include: (1) military service exclusions based on 
gender identity are suspect or quasisuspect; (2) classifications based 
on gender identity are actually sex-based classifications, warranting 
195. See Dep’t of Def., Instruction NO. 6130.03, Medical Standards 
For Appointment, Enlistment, Or Induction Into The Military Services 
(2018).
196. Agnes Gereben Schaefer, et al., Assessing the Implications of 
Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly (RAND Corporation) 
(2016),  https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1530.html [https:// 
perma.cc/HP96-LR7B] (government-requested study that concluded permit-
ting transgender persons to serve in the military would not adversely affect 
military readiness or deployability and would not involve significant cost to the 
government).
197. See, e.g., Merriam, supra note 23, at 57 (arguing the ban is unconstitu-
tional animus); John Culhane, Trump’s Transgender Ban is a Legal Land Mine, Po-
litico (July 26, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/ story/2017/07/26/trump-
transgender-troops-ban-legal-landmine-215425 [https://perma.cc/HUM9-QDFR].
198. See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj., Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-
MJP (W.D. Wash. 2018); Pls.’ Appl. for Prelim. Inj. at 22, Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 
F. Supp. 3d 167 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 17-1597); Pls’ Notice of Mot. And Mot. for 
Prelim. Inj.; Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. Thereof, Stockman v. Trump, No. EDCV 
17–1799 JGB (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017).
199. This is precisely what the District Court did in Doe 1 v. Trump, ulti-
mately concluding that intermediate scrutiny was warranted and that though 
the government’s asserted interests of maximizing military effectiveness, lethal-
ity, unit cohesion, and budgetary considerations were important, the transgen-
der ban was not substantially related to accomplishing that interest.  Doe 1, 275 
F. Supp. 3d at 217.  As noted above, similar equal protection analysis was also the 
basis of plaintiffs’ early successes in Karnoski, 2017 WL 6311305, at *7; Stone 
v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768–72 (D. Md. 2017); and Stockman, 2017 WL 
9732572, at *13–14.
892020 IDENTITy-BASED MILITARy SERvICE ExCLuSION
intermediate scrutiny; and (3) the transgender ban constitutes 
impermissible animus.
However, the Obergefell majority’s avoidance of traditional 
equal protection arguments cautions against relying solely on those 
arguments.  Instead, plaintiffs challenging the transgender military 
ban would benefit from relying on Obergefell’s equal protection 
development: that the government may not demean a group by 
excluding it from an important positive right when such exclusion 
results in dignitary harm.
By focusing on the right to not be demeaned by one’s govern-
ment through exclusion from an important, government-bestowed 
privilege, plaintiffs challenging the ban will be able to make per-
suasive arguments that excluding certain individuals from military 
service may be unconstitutional.  An equal protection-based funda-
mental right can be identified by first examining the importance the 
government has placed on the positive right and then assessing the 
demeaning effect of exclusion from that right.
Notably, Obergefell’s commentary regarding the importance 
of marriage is related to the importance of military service eligibil-
ity.  In discussing the fundamental nature of the right to marriage, 
the majority observed that marriage:
“Promises nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to 
their station in life;200
Is an institution that has existed for millennia and across 
civilizations;
Transformed strangers into relatives, binding societies together;
Lies at the foundation of government;
Is referenced in untold religious, philosophical texts and art 
and literature in all their forms;
Has a history of both continuity and change;
Is a right older than the Bill of Rights; and
Dignifies persons who wish to define themselves by their com-
mitment to each other.”201
It is striking how many of the above qualities apply to both 
marriage and military service.
Furthermore, the Obergefell majority opinion cited four rea-
sons for its conclusion that marriage is a fundamental right.  The 
applicability of these four reasons to military service is less clear. 
First, the Court noted that the right to personal choice regarding 
marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy because 
decisions concerning marriage are among the most intimate an 
200. Obergefell,  135 S. Ct. at 2594.
201. Id. at 2594–95, 2599.
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individual can make.202  Citing the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts, the majority noted “the decision whether and whom 
to marry is among life’s momentous acts of self-definition.”203  To 
be sure, joining the military is a momentous act that, for many, 
becomes an act of self-definition.  On the other hand, the majority’s 
second reason for the fundamentality of marriage—that marriage 
supports a two-person union unlike any other—is clearly inappli-
cable to military service.  Third, the majority claims that marriage 
is fundamental because it “safeguards children and families” and 
thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, 
and education.  Marriage allows for material protection of children 
and families, but also provides recognition and structure that allows 
children to “understand the integrity and closeness of their own 
family and its concord with other families in their community.”204 
While military service does not help children better understand 
their family, it does, in a broad sense, safeguard children and fami-
lies through protection of the nation.  Fourth, the Court explained 
that marriage was fundamental because it is the keystone of our 
social order.  The Court noted that marriage is the “foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civ-
ilization nor progress.”  Marriage is thus a “building block of our 
national community.”205  Similarly, the national security provided by 
the military is foundational to social order, though not part of the 
social fabric itself.
The Obergefell Court was particularly concerned with the 
government’s attachment of importance to marriage and ultimately 
held that the Equal Protection Clause protects against demeaning 
selective exclusions from government-bestowed privileges.  Recall 
the Court’s concern that:
As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the 
significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the 
effect of teaching that gays and lesbians are unequal in import-
ant respects.  It demeans gays and lesbians for the State to lock 
them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.206
To demonstrate the significance the State attached to mar-
riage, the Court recited the list of benefits accorded married 
couples, including:
202. Id. at 2599.
203. Id. (citing Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 
955 (Mass. 2003)).
204. Id. at 2600.
205. Id. at 2601.
206. Id. at 2601–02.
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 taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate 
succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital 
access; medical decision making authority; adoption rights; 
the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certifi-
cates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; 
workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child 
custody, support, and visitation rules.207
Likewise, the government has attached great significance to 
military service through significant, and potentially lifelong, benefits 
that include pensions, disability benefits, medical care, education-
al benefits, hiring preferences, citizenship status, tax incentives, 
and others.208
Society, too, accords many benefits to active servicemembers 
and veterans in a variety of forms, including commercial discounts, 
public and private gestures of appreciation, and general procla-
mations of respect for veterans and their military service.209  The 
public’s reverence for the military is not just anecdotal.  Polls 
repeatedly show that the public trusts and respects the military 
more than nearly all other institutions.210  Furthermore, voters con-
tinue to value military service by their elected representatives.211
207. Id. at 2601.
208. Military Benefits At a Glance, Military.com, https://www.mili-
tary.com/join-armed-forces/military-benefits-overview.html [https://perma.
cc/3BGP-7UWQ] (listing many pecuniary benefits of military service); Tax 
Breaks for the Military, Internal Revenue Service (July 15, 2016), https://www.
irs.gov/ newsroom/tax-breaks-for-the-military [https://perma.cc/D44H-8UEZ] 
(explaining tax benefits available to military personnel).
209. Mara Leighton, 50 Stores that Offer Military Discounts All year 
Long, Business Insider (May 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/mil-
itary-discounts [https://perma.cc/8EE5-TXQN]; James Fallows, The Tragedy of 
the American Military, The Atlantic (Jan.-Feb. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2015/01/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516 
[https://perma.cc/VJC7-352H] (arguing that the general public’s expressions of 
gratitude, political figures’ gestures and proclamations of respect, and the pub-
lic’s overall confidence in the military is tragically misguided).
210. See, e.g., Ashley Bunch, Poll: Americans Respect All Military Branch-
es, but Air Force Takes the Lead, Military Times (May 30, 2017), https://www.
militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2017/05/30/poll-americans-respect-all-
military-branches-but-air-force-takes-the-lead [https://perma.cc/74QL-ZN-
HC]; Courtney Johnson, Trust in the Military Exceeds Trust in Other Institu-
tions in Western Europe and u.S., Pew Research Center: FactTank (Sep. 4, 
2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/09/04/trust-in-the-military-
exceeds-trust-in-other-institutions-in-western-europe-and-u-s [https://perma.
cc/6SEN-V8GR]; Jonathan M. Ladd, et al., 2018 American Institutional Confi-
dence Poll, http://aicpoll.com [https://perma.cc/W7LJ-BV9N].
211. Barbara Goldberg, u.S. House Freshman Class Includes Most veter-
ans in Nearly a Decade, Reuters (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-congress-veterans/u-s-house-freshman-class-includes-most-veterans-in-
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The benefits the government and society attach to mili-
tary service demonstrate its importance and, simultaneously, the 
demeaning effect of exclusion.  Obergefell instructed that the more 
benefits the government and society heap on marriage, the more 
the exclusion from that status serves to demean.212  And as the 
government heaps benefits on military servicemembers, it confers 
dignity upon them in the way Justice Kennedy understood states 
confer dignity on married couples.  So too, the benefits that govern-
ment and society have placed on military service have the effect of 
demeaning those who are locked out, precisely because the govern-
ment and society have established military service as being at the 
apex of participation in and contribution to the nation.  Barring cer-
tain groups from military service has the same demeaning effect as 
barring some couples from the privilege of marriage.
In positive and negative ways, military service has historical-
ly been tied to being American.  The government and society laud 
military service in the ways identified above.  Especially important 
are the ways in which military service has been directly linked to 
being both culturally and legally American.  Military service can 
lead to a quicker path to United States citizenship, and failure to 
serve can diminish one’s citizenship status.  Indeed, for nearly 100 
years, the United States literally and legally equated military ser-
vice and citizenship.  Through the three largest military conflicts in 
American history—the Civil War,213 World War I, and World War 
II214—desertion from the military meant loss of citizenship, render-
ing the disgraced veteran stateless.215  Importantly, one could regain 
nearly-a-decade-idUSKCN1NC2LW [https://perma.cc/UB6R-U8WE] (noting 
increase in number of veterans and some politicians’ use of their military ser-
vice as demonstrating suitability for office).
212. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
213. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490 (1865).
214. See, e.g., Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 401, 54 Stat. 
1137, 1169 (1940) amended by Pub. L. No. 221-78, § 401, 58 Stat. 4 (“A person 
who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall 
lose his nationality by: . . . ”[d]eserting the military or naval forces of the United 
States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by a court martial . . . .”).
215. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (ruling the practice of loss 
of citizenship due to military desertion an unconstitutional excess of executive 
power and a violation of the Eighth Amendment); Joshua E. Kastenberg et 
al., In A Time Of Total War: The Federal Judiciary and National Defense 
1940–1954, 239–40 (Ashgate Press 2016); Joshua E. Kastenberg, Law in War, 
Law as War: Brigadier General Joseph Holt and the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral’s Department in the Civil War and Early Reconstruction, 1860–1868 
(Carolina Academic Press 2011); John P. Roche, Loss of American National-
ity—The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 25, 60–62 
(1950).
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lost citizenship—and thus one’s legal status as an American—
through renewed military service during war.216
Clearly, military service confers status, and the corresponding 
exclusion from military service serves to demean.  Society’s confer-
ral of status on those who serve in the military as American, and the 
demeaning effect of exclusion from that status is, tellingly demon-
strated by treatment of black veterans following WWI and WWII.217 
Indeed, in the Jim Crow South, no one was more at risk of experi-
encing violence and targeted racial terror than Black veterans.218 
Precisely because of their military service and its concomitant ben-
efits and dignity, Black veterans were seen as a particular threat 
to continued racial subordination.  Thousands of Black veterans 
were assaulted, threatened, abused, or lynched following mili-
tary service.  Especially irritating to their tormentors were Black 
veterans who had the audacity to wear their military uniforms.219 
Throughout America, and especially in the South, whites accosted 
Black veterans, often with the express purpose stripping them of 
their uniforms.220
The fear that Black veterans would point to their mili-
tary service as a basis for equality was not just the sentiment of 
unhinged lynch mobs.  Mainstream newspapers also expressed con-
cern that Black veterans would believe they were equal because 
of their military service.221  This sentiment was even articulated on 
216. To amend the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 221-78, § 401, 58 
Stat. 4 (“[Notwithstanding loss of nationality or citizenship or civil or political 
rights under the terms of this or previous Acts by reason of desertion commit-
ted in time of war, restoration to active duty with such military or naval forces 
in time of war or the reenlistment or induction of such a person in time of war 
with permission of competent military or naval authority, prior or subsequent 
to the effective date of this Act, shall be deemed to have the immediate effect 
of restoring such nationality or citizenship and all civil and political rights here-
tofore or hereafter so lost and of removing all civil and political disabilities 
resulting therefrom . . . .”).
217. Lynching in America: Targeting Black veterans, Equal Justice Initia-
tive (2017), https://eji.org/reports/online/lynching-in-america- targeting-black-
veterans [https://perma.cc/SMX6-8U2M].
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Chad L. Williams, Torchbearers of Democracy: African American 
Soldiers in the world War I Era 239 (The University of North Carolina Press 
2010).
221. See, e.g., Lynching in America: Targeting Black veterans, supra note 
217 (citing Nip It in the Bud, True Democrat (Dec. 21, 1918)) (asserting that 
military service had “probably given [black veteran] men more exalted ideas of 
their station in life than really exists, and having these ideas they will be guilty 
of many acts of self-assertion, arrogance, and insolence . . . there will be much 
friction before they sink back into their old groove, and accept the fact that 
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the floor of the U.S. Senate.  Arguing that reintroduction of Black 
servicemen would “inevitably lead to disaster,” Senator James K. 
Vardaman cautioned:
 Impress the negro with the fact that he is defending the flag, 
inflate his untutored soul with military airs, teach him that it is 
his duty to keep the emblem of the Nation flying triumphantly 
in the air, it is but a short step to the conclusion that his politi-
cal rights must be respected.222
When we recognize that government and society confer on 
servicemembers and veterans the status of “bona fide American” 
and that service members are entitled to equality, the demean-
ing and stigmatic effect of being denied military service eligibility 
becomes clear.  Courts have noted the demeaning effect of exclusion 
from military service.  For instance, the Obergefell majority itself 
noted that exclusion from marriage conflicted with the “just claim 
to dignity” of LGB people.223  And in denying the government’s 
request for an emergency stay of a district court’s injunction against 
implementation of the transgender ban, the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit noted the demeaning effect of the transgender ban:
 [I]n the balancing of equities, it must be remembered that 
all Plaintiffs seek during this litigation is to serve their Nation 
with honor and dignity, volunteering to face extreme hard-
ships, to endure lengthy deployments and separation from 
family and friends, and to willingly make the ultimate sacrifice 
of their lives if necessary to protect the Nation, the people of 
the United States, and the Constitution against all who would 
attack them.224
Indeed, the demeaning effect of exclusion from military ser-
vice eligibility can be poignantly articulated in this way: “you’re not 
worthy of dying for your country.”
All exclusions, including ability-based exclusions, have the 
potential to demean.  But there is a constitutionally significant 
difference between identity-based exclusions and ability-based 
exclusions: the Equal Protection Clause demands that similarly situ-
ated people be treated equally.  When exclusion is based on identity 
rather than ability, the likelihood that the government’s exclusion 
social equality will never be accepted in the South.”).
222. Williams, supra note 220, at 31.
223. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).  The majority opin-
ion also notes the irony that one of the plaintiffs in the case served in the mil-
itary to defend the freedoms the Constitution provides, while not being given 
the same freedom.  Id. at 2595.
224. Order, Doe 1 v. Trump, No. 17-5267 (D.C. Cir. 2017), 2017 WL 6553389, 
at *3.
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is impermissibly demeaning increases.  This is for the same reason 
that courts are suspicious of government classifications that bear 
little relationship to the affected group’s ability to participate in 
or contribute to society: law’s purpose is to govern behavior, and 
laws that focus on identity rather than behavior tend to be based on 
irrational prejudice.  This requires careful judicial consideration of 
the underlying rationale for exclusion.  Military service exclusions 
should be carried out in the same way that all performance-based 
unit cohesion exclusions are carried out—by enforcing the capabil-
ity requirements rather than imposing a complete ban on all people 
with a particular characteristic that might affect ability.225
In relying on Obergefell to assess whether exclusion from mil-
itary service eligibility is impermissibly demeaning, a court should 
ask: does rejection from the military have the same functional 
effect as rejection from the institution of marriage?  The institution 
of marriage is foundational to the nation and society.  Similarly, the 
institution of the military is foundational to the nation’s history and 
existence.  Participation in that institution takes on an increasingly 
fundamental character, as exclusion from that institution demeans 
the excluded.
Conclusion
Obergefell v. Hodges not only vindicated the rights of same 
sex couples to marry, it promised a new era of inclusion.  Much 
post-Obergefell analysis has focused on its importance and promise 
in expanding fundamental rights based on substantive due pro-
cess.  But the Obergefell majority was largely focused on stigmatic 
exclusion, a government infringement best addressed through the 
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.  Obergefell ushered 
in a new understanding that the government may not, without 
sufficient justification, hold out important positive rights while 
selectively excluding some from those rights, when such exclusion 
serves to demean the excluded.
With the military transgender ban, the federal government 
has attempted the same demeaning exclusion that many states 
attempted with same-sex marriage bans: barring a group from par-
ticipating in an important positive right based on their identity 
rather than their ability.  While due process and traditional equal 
225. For example, the “inability to adapt to the military environment” 
during training, which can be based on the inability to complete training re-
quirements, can serve as a basis for discharge, as can repeated fitness test fail-
ures.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Army Reg. No. 635–200 (2016); Dep’t of Air Force, AFI 
36–3208 ¶ 5.65 (2004).
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protection arguments advance plaintiffs’ challenges to the trans-
gender ban, so too does Obergefell’s admonition: government may 
not treat its citizens unequally by excluding some from important 
government-provided rights when the inequality serves to demean. 
Transgender persons interested in military service hope not to be 
relegated to second-class status, excluded from one of the nation’s 
most cherished institutions.  They ask for equal dignity in the eyes 
of the law.  The Constitution grants them that right.
